央企董事会试点与上市公司盈余管理行为

The Pilot of the Board of Directors of Central Government-Owned Enterprises and Earnings Management Behavior of Listed Companies

如何充分发挥董事会作用一直是公司治理研究的重要问题。利用国资委实施央企董事会试点这一准自然实验,以上市公司盈余管理行为为观察对象,本文实证检验了董事会试点的经济后果。通过采用多时点DID模型,研究发现,国资委在央企实施董事会试点对央企控股上市公司应计盈余管理没有影响,但会影响其进行真实盈余管理。进一步研究发现,在竞争性央企、存在异地独董以及管理层持股情况下,上市公司更可能进行真实盈余管理。本文研究不仅丰富了董事会治理和盈余管理的相关文献,也为检验央企董事会试点改革效应提供了新视角,为进一步深化央企治理改革提供了政策启示。

How to give full play to the role of the board of directors has always been an important issue in corporate governance research.Using SASAC to carry out the quasi-natural experiment of the board of directors of the Central Government-Owned Enterprises(CGOEs),we examine the economic consequences of the board of directors’pilot with the earnings management behavior of listed companies.By adopting the multi-point DID model,we find that the SASAC’s implementation of the board of directors pilot has no impact on the accrual-based earnings management(AEM)of state-owned enterprise controlled listed companies,but it will affect the listed companies to prefer the real transaction-based earnings management(REM).Further research finds that listed companies are more likely to carry out real earnings management under the circumstances of competitive central enterprises,the existence of nonnative independent directors and the shareholding of management.Our study not only enriches the relevant documents of board governance and earnings management,but also provides a new perspective for testing the pilot reform of the board of directors of the CGOEs,and provides policy inspiration for further deepening the governance reform of the CGOEs.