“向外看”的内省是否可能——论德雷斯克的“移位知觉”理论

Is“Outward Looking”Introspection Possible?——On Dretske’s“Displaced Perception”Theory

“内省”在字面上经常被理解为“向内看”的活动,基于这一理解发展出了关于内省的内感官理论,它将内省解释为对我们自己心理状态的内部知觉。与之相对,德雷斯克的“移位知觉”理论将内省理解为基于“向外看”的自成一类的推断,并认为该理论相较内感官理论更加简单与合理。然而,不仅如艾迪德批评的,德雷斯克的内省推断缺乏合适的关联信念,而且,它还面临内感官理论的挑战和推断概念方面的困难。因此,德雷斯克的“移位知觉”理论作为对内省的推断解释是不恰当的。

Taken literally,“introspection”is often understood as an activity of“looking inward”.Based on this understanding,philosophers have developed the inner sense theory of introspection,which explains introspection as internal perception of our own mental states.In contrast,Dretske in his“displaced perception”theory takes introspection as a sui generis inference from“looking outward”,and considers his account simpler and more reasonable than those theories about inner sense.However,not only does Dretske’s introspective inference lack appropriate connecting beliefs,just as Aydede has criticized,but it also faces challenges from inner sense accounts and difficulties concerning the concept of inference.Therefore,Dresker’s“displaced perception”theory as an inferential account of introspection is inappropriate.