布洛克的意识概念划分理论

Block’s Theory of the Conceptual Division of Consciousness

布洛克主张“意识”是一个混杂概念,至少可以划分为现象意识与通达意识,二者在概念使用与事实经验上均可区分。将论证通达意识独立存在面临逻辑困境,现象意识独立存在仍然面临方法论难题;两种意识类型表达不同的内涵,在语词使用上有进行概念区分的必要;但严苛意义上,并无可靠证据能够支持两类意识在事实经验上可区分。

Block argues that “Consciousness” is a mongrel concept that can be at least divided into phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, both conceptually and factually distinguishable.This paper will demonstrate that the independent existence of access consciousness faces logical difficulties, and the separate existence of phenomenal consciousness still faces methodological problems.Accordingly, it is argued that the two types of consciousness express different modes of presentation and that a conceptual distinction is necessary regarding word usage;however, there is no reliable evidence to support the factual separability in any strict sense.