产品市场竞争与机构投资者持股的公司治理效应——基于高管超额薪酬视角

The Corporate Governance Effect of Product Market Competition and Shareholding of Institutional Investors

本文选择2010~2017年沪深两市A股主板上市公司为研究样本,从高管超额薪酬的视角实证研究了产品市场竞争与机构投资者持股这两种外部治理机制的公司治理效应以及两者间的交互关系。研究结果表明,产品市场竞争与机构投资者持股作为公司重要的外部治理机制,能够有效降低高管超额薪酬,并且这两种机制在降低高管超额薪酬方面存在明显的替代性;进一步分析发现,这种替代性在国有企业和高管权力较小的公司中更明显。本文的研究丰富了公司治理领域的文献,为上市公司进一步完善治理框架和政府部门深化相关政策提供了经验证据。

This paper employs China’s A-share listed companies from 2010-2017 as research samples and empirically tests the corporate governance effects of product market competition and shareholding of institutional investors as well as their interactional relationship.The results show that,as important external governance mechanisms,product market competition and shareholding of institutional investors can effectively reduce the executives’overpayment,and there exists substitutability between them.Further analysis finds that the above substitutability are more obvious in state-owned companies and companies which executives have less management power.The research of this paper enriches the literature in the field of corporate governance and provides empirical evidence for listed companies to further improve their governance framework as well as government to deepen relevant policies.