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退牧还草政策下退牧户违规放牧与地方政府监管的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis between No-Grazing Herders'Illegal Grazing and Local Government Regulation under the Policy of Returning Grazing Land to Grassland
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摘要 退牧户违规放牧行为不利于退牧还草政策的可持续实施。违规放牧行为与地方政府监管之间的动态博弈分析能定量化理解二者行为的成本效益边界,有助于制定合理有效的监管对策。从微观主体的收益函数出发,构建地方政府监管与退牧户违规放牧的演化博弈模型,根据复制动态方程分析参与方的行为演化规律及稳定策略,利用Python仿真工具探讨草地有效治理的影响因素。研究发现:(1)在特定条件下,可实现地方政府监管、退牧户不违规放牧的动态均衡;(2)提高违规放牧罚款、增加工程补贴、加大政府监管压力、提高退牧户其他收入,均能有效减少违规放牧;(3)监管成本增加会延缓均衡达成;(4)违规放牧收益增加会延长退牧户达到均衡的时间,但缩短政府达到均衡的时间。基于此,本研究提出加大处罚力度、优化补贴政策、完善监督机制、提供就业培训等建议,为制定遏制违规放牧的政策提供科学依据,促进生态保护与民生福祉协调发展。 No-grazing herders'illegal grazing hinders the sustainable development of the Returning Grazing Land to Grassland Project.Dynamic game analysis between illegal grazing and local government regulation provides a quantitative understanding of the cost-benefit boundaries of both parties'behaviours,which helps to formulate reasonable and effective regulatory countermeasures.Starting from the payoff functions of micro subjects,this study constructed an evolutionary game model between local government regulation and no-grazing herders'illegal grazing.The behavioral evolution rules and stability strategies of participants were analyzed according to the replication dynamic equation,and the influencing factors of effective grassland management were discussed by using Python simulation tools.The study found that:(1)Under certain conditions,the dynamic equilibrium between local government supervision and non-illegal grazing could be achieved.(2)Enhancing penalties for illegal grazing,providing more project subsidies,increasing the pressure on local governments to enforce regulations,and increasing no-grazing herders'income from other industries could effectively reduce illegal grazing.(3)Increased regulatory costs can delay equilibrium.(4)Increased benefits of illegal grazing extend herders'time to reach equilibrium but shorten the government's.Based on these findings,this study proposed to increase penalties,optimize subsidy policies,improve monitoring mechanisms,and provide employment training to provide a scientific basis for formulating countermeasures to curb illegal grazing,promoting the coordinated development of ecological protection and people's well-being.
作者 裴孝东 李军豪 石贵 张聪 周立华 PEI Xiaodong;LI Junhao;SHI Gui;ZHANG Cong;ZHOU Lihua(Institutes of Science and Development,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190;School of Public Policy and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100049;Northwest Institute of Eco-Environment and Resources,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Lanzhou 730000)
出处 《科技促进发展》 2024年第6期509-519,共11页 Science & Technology for Development
基金 2021年中国科学院战略性先导科技专项(A类)“创建生态草牧业科技体系”子课题(XDA26010301):牧区畜牧资源调查与评估,负责人:周立华 2019年国家科技部第二次青藏高原综合科学考察研究国家专项(2019QZKK040404):青藏高原生态安全屏障重大生态工程成效评估,负责人:周立华
关键词 演化博弈 违规放牧 退牧还草 政府行为 草地退化 evolutionary game illegal grazing return grazing land to grassland government behavior grassland degradation
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