控股股东关系联盟与企业实质性创新——基于双重治理的中介作用

Controlling Shareholder Relations Alliance and Enterprise Substantive Innovation——Based on Mediating Effect of Dual Governance

控股股东关系联盟作为一种非正式制度,是否对企业实质性创新具有积极的治理效应,研究中尚缺乏关注。采用2010~2020年A股上市公司数据,实证检验控股股东关系联盟对企业实质性创新的影响效果和作用机制。研究发现,控股股东关系联盟能显著提升企业实质性创新;机制检验发现,控股股东关系联盟通过治理效率和信息传递两条路径对实质性创新发挥双重治理作用,即抑制了控股股东私利侵占、增强了分析师关注度,进而促进实质性创新。进一步研究发现,控股股东关系联盟对实质性创新的促进作用在低股票流动性、高新技术企业和国有企业中更显著,关系类型越多、强关系联盟规模越大、异质性越高,提升实质性创新的效果越显著。

As an informal institution,few studies focus on the bright effect of the controlling shareholder relations alliance on enterprise substantive innovation.Using the data of China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020,empirical test is carried out on the effect and path of the controlling shareholder relations alliance on enterprise substantive innovation.The results show that the controlling shareholder relations alliance can significantly enhance the level of substantial innovation.The mechanism test finds that the controlling shareholder relations alliance exerts dual governance effects on substantive innovation through the both paths of governance efficiency and information efficiency,it suppresses the embezzlement of controlling shareholders’private interests,increases analysts’attention and eases financing constraints,thereby promoting substantive innovation.Further research found that the promotion more significant in low stock liquidity,high-tech and state-owned enterprise,the enrichment,strength and high heterogeneity of controlling shareholder relations enhance the effect of substantive innovation more significantly.