摘要
研究政府对城市生活垃圾资源化的最优补贴政策,将政府补贴作为决策变量,设置“减量化、无害化、资源化”指标衡量产品的社会效益与环境效益,根据Stackerberg博弈理论构建政府、企业、消费者之间四种补贴方式下的三阶段博弈模型,采用逆向求解法得到社会最大福利下政府的最优补贴政策,并利用Matlab2020b分别对四种补贴方式进行仿真模拟,比较效益差异。研究表明,当补贴方式为仅补贴资源化生产企业,且调整因子为t=0.400000时,社会福利达到最大。
This paper empirically studies the government’s optimal subsidy policy for the recycling of municipal solid waste,takes government subsidies as a decision variable,and sets“reduction,harmlessness,and resource utilization”indicators to measure the social and environmental benefits of the product.According to the stackerberg game theory,constructs a three-stage game model under the four subsidy methods between the government,enterprises,and consumers,uses the reverse solution method to obtain the government’s optimal subsidy policy under the social maximum welfare,and uses Matlab2020b to simulate the four subsidy methods respectively to compare benefit difference.Research shows that when the subsidy method is to subsidize resource-based production enterprises only,and the adjustment factor is t=0.400000,social welfare reaches the maximum.
作者
徐颖
韩雪源
陈妍
王有松
XU Ying;HAN Xueyuan;CHEN Yan;WANG Yousong(School of Economics and Management,Beijing Information Science and Technology University,Beijing 100096,China;Junfa Group Co.,Ltd,Kunming 650000,China)
出处
《建筑经济》
北大核心
2022年第S01期942-947,共6页
Construction Economy
基金
北京市社会科学基金项目(17GLB029)
关键词
城市生活垃圾
资源化
博弈分析
政府最优补贴
municipal solid waste
resource utilization
game analysis
optimal government subsidy