保险驱动的网约车三方演化博弈研究

Research on the Tripartite Evolutionary Game of Insurance Driven Ride Hailing

随着网约车的不断发展,因其便利性越来越受到人们欢迎,然而监管层面存在的漏洞也影响着人们的出行安全。由于存在违规成本较低、监管责任难以压实、保费制定欠缺灵活性等问题,迫切需要一种网约车行业的监管体。论文在分析网约车出行体系三方主体的基础上,建立保险公司、网约车平台和乘客之间的三方演化博弈体系,设计了一种针对网约车保险的算法,通过动态调整惩罚性保费,在监管得到保证的同时使乘客采取守纪策略,并理论证明了该算法的个体理性和激励相容等属性。在不同数值下的演化路径与稳定策略仿真实验结果表明:系统稳定情况演化是各利益相关主体博弈互动的结果,提升惩罚性保费、提高违规成本有利于推动结果向理想策略演化;演化博弈的结果,与初始策略人群占比无关。

With the continuous development of online car-hailing,online car-hailing is gradually popular due to its conve⁃nience.However,the deficiencies in the supervision of online car-hailing also have a hidden impact on people's travel safety.Due to the low cost of violation,regulatory responsibilities that are hard to pin down and inflexible premiums,there's an urgent need to es⁃tablish a supervision system of online car-hailing.Based on the analysis of the tripartite main body of the online car-hailing travel system,this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game system between insurance companies,online car-hailing platforms and passengers.This paper also designs an algorithm for online car-hailing insurance,which dynamically adjusts the penalty premium so that the supervision can be guaranteed while passengers adopt discipline strategy,and theoretically proves the properties of the al⁃gorithm,such as individual rationality and incentive compatibility.Through researching the evolutionary simulation of evolutionary paths and stability strategies under different values,the results show that:The evolution of system stability is the result of the game interaction of all stakeholders.Increasing the penalty premium and the cost of violation is beneficial to promote the outcome to evolve towards the ideal strategy.The result of the evolutionary game is irrelevant to the proportion of the initial strategy population.