自愿性信息披露、高管超额薪酬与企业价值

Voluntary Information Disclosure,Excess Compensation & Corporate Value

本文以2012—2014年上市公司为样本,基于管理层权力理论研究分析了上市公司高管薪酬与企业业绩的关系,并实证检验了自愿性信息披露对上市公司薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。研究发现,上市公司高管薪酬与企业业绩仍具有显著的正相关关系,然而高管的超额薪酬与企业业绩却成显著的负相关关系,国有企业表现更为明显。同时,研究还发现自愿性信息披露对上市公司的薪酬业绩敏感性有显著的正向调节作用,为上市公司缓解薪酬代理问题提供了新的思路。

Based on 2012 to 2014 listed companies as samples,this paper analyzes the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance of listed companies,and examines the voluntary disclosure of listed companies pay performance sensitivity.The results show that executive pay and corporate performance of listed companies still have a significant positive correlation.However,excess compensation and performance has significant negative correlation,indicating that excess compensation is distorted products on executive compensation contracts,executives through their own power to the enterprise rent grab,and does not reflect the efforts of senior level itself and performance of enterprises.At the same time,this paper finds that voluntary disclosure has significant moderating effect on the pay performance sensitivity of listed companies.This research provides a new way for listed companies to alleviate agency problems of compensation.