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双重股权公司治理制度改革研究——基于控股股东与独立董事的博弈分析 被引量:4

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摘要 对双重股权结构公司治理的研究应当主要分析股权与控制权结构变化对权力决策机制的影响,而不能直接套用传统治理模式。研究发现:第一,引发内部利益冲突的原因包括:控股股东表决权与经济权利的分离、外部控制权市场消失,以及董事会与监事会结构性失去监督作用。第二,双重股权结构下控股股东可以取得完全控制权,促进控股股东中心主义的形成,同时打破原有的权力制衡结构,引发控股股东权力滥用问题。从代理成本理论角度分析,独立董事作为唯一的内部监督主体,可以通过行使类似积极股东权利的方式来降低控股股东中心主义导致的成本超限风险,形成独立董事积极主义与控股股东中心主义的博弈,避免公司长期融资能力减弱。为保障独董履行监督职能的积极性,本文提出以下建议:分置独董提名权来优化董事会结构,设置独董控制型日落条款,以多元化方式激励独董履职,审慎要求独董承担连带责任并避免过分责任,合理设置免责事由。 The study of corporate governance with dual ownership structure should mainly analyze the impact of changes in ownership and control structure on power decision-making mechanisms,rather than directly applying traditional governance models.The research finds that:firstly,the causes of internal conflicts of interest include the separation of voting rights and economic rights of controlling shareholders,the disappearance of the market for external control rights,and the structural loss of supervisory roles between the board of directors and the supervisory board.Secondly,under the dual ownership structure,controlling shareholders can obtain complete control,promoting the formation of controlling shareholder centrism,while breaking the original power balance structure,causing the abuse of power by controlling shareholders.From the perspective of agency cost theory,independent directors,as the only internal supervision subject,can reduce the risk of cost overrun caused by controlling shareholder centrism by exercising similar positive shareholder rights,forming a game between independent director activism and controlling shareholder centrism,and avoiding the weakening of the company's long-term financing ability.In order to ensure the enthusiasm of independent directors in performing their supervisory functions,this article proposes the following suggestions:optimizing the structure of the board of directors by separating the nomination rights for independent directors,setting up sunset clauses for independent directors to control,encouraging independent directors to perform their duties in a diversified manner,prudently requiring independent directors to assume joint and several liabilities,avoiding excessive liability,and reasonably setting up exemptions.
作者 马瑞乾
出处 《金融监管研究》 北大核心 2023年第1期63-80,共18页 Financial Regulation Research
基金 国家社科基金后期资助项目“市场经济背景下国有资本运营的法律制度构建”(项目编号:19FFXB027) 西南政法大学2021年科研创新项目“注册制下股票公开发行审核方式探讨”(项目编号:2021XZXS-016)的资助
关键词 双重股权 控股股东中心主义 利益冲突 独董积极主义 监督 Double Equity Controlling Shareholders Primacy Conflicts of Interest Independent Director Activism Supervise
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