蒋介石应对卢沟桥事变新考

New Research on Chiang Kai-shek’s Response to Lugouqiao Incident

卢沟桥事变的爆发,对于蒋介石的决策能力是一次严峻挑战。他从一开始就认定日军挑衅限于局部,不会演变成大规模侵华战争;在没有全面开战准备的前提下派遣中央军北上、发表庐山讲话,实为虚张声势,带有很大的投机性;授权宋哲元处理中日冲突,始终没有给出具体让步条件,本想推卸责任,却导致交涉失控。应对过程折射出蒋介石的思维方式、行事风格:始终心存侥幸甚至不切实际的幻想,易感情用事而缺少理智与冷静,极度自信却又不愿承担责任。

The outbreak of the Lugouqiao Incident posed a severe challenge to Chiang Kai-shek’s decision-making ability.He was convinced that the Japanese army would provoke a local war that was not going to evolve into a large-scale war of aggression against China.It was actually bluffing and largely speculative of him to send the Central Army to the northern part of China and to deliver the speech in Lushan without making full preparations for the war.Chiang authorized Song Zheyuan to deal with the conflict,but didn’t give him specific concession conditions.He had meant to shirk responsibility,but the outcome was the failure of negotiations.The process reflects Chiang Kai-shek’s way of thinking and doing things.He would like to leave things to chance and had unrealistic fantasies;He was emotional and lacking in reason and calmness;He was extremely self-confident but unwilling to take responsibility.