左右两难?基于A股市场新股发行定价市盈率倍数限制的分析

A Dilemma?The Price/Earnings Ratio Cap of IPO Pricing in Chinese Stock Markets

A股市场自成立以来,绝大部分时间内新股发行(IPO)定价都受到市盈率倍数限制.这种行政干预,是否会影响公司的盈余管理行为和IPO定价效率?本文以2005年1月至2012年4月A股上市公司为研究对象,探讨新股发行时定价有无市盈率倍数限制对公司盈余管理行为和定价效率的影响.结果发现:取消市盈率倍数限制,一方面,提高了新股的定价效率、减小了股票上市首日的收益,提高了资源配置效率;但另一方面,却加大了公司盈余管理行为,降低了会计信息质量.进一步,与国有企业相比,非国有企业在无市盈率倍数限制时,盈余管理的程度更重,股票上市首日的收益更小.本文丰富了政府干预IPO定价相关的经济行为与后果研究,有助于监管层进一步优化和完善IPO定价制度.

Since the establishment of the A-share markets,the IPO pricing has been limited by the price/earnings(P/E)ratio cap for most of the time.Will this kind of administrative intervention affect the company’s earnings management and IPO pricing efficiency?This paper discusses the impact of the P/E ratio cap on the company’s earnings management and the pricing efficiency by using the sample from January 2005 to April 2012.The results show that,on one hand,the cancellation of P/E ratio cap can improve the pricing efficiency of new shares and reduce the IPO underpricing,which is conducive to the effective allocation of resources;on the other hand,the cancellation of P/E ratio cap increases the company’s earnings management behavior,which is not conducive to improve the quality of accounting information.In addition,compared with state-owned enterprises,non-state-owned enterprises have higher earnings management,smaller underpricing and more efficient pricing when there is no P/E ratio cap.This paper enriches the research on economic behavior and consequences related to IPO pricing,helps the regulatory layer to further improve the IPO pricing system.