开源还是节流?——我国商业银行效率、行为模式与所有制差异

Scrimp or Save?Profit Efficiency,Heterogenous Behavior and Ownership in Chinese Commercial Banks

本文提出了Farrell-Type利润效率的数据包络估计方法,对我国29个省市的130家商业银行2014年至2016年的利润效率进行评估和效率分解.我们将银行的利润效率归因为收益增长(开源)和成本控制(节流)两类行为模式,并分析了所有制差异对行为模式的影响.研究发现了商业银行之间不同的所有制会导致不同的行为模式和效率表现,其中国有商业银行的利润效率显著更低,而股份制商业银行的效率最高.进一步的效率分解和回归分析发现,国有商业银行的无效率来源主要是开源的动力不足,这与其公有制公益性以及在银行体系中扮演的稳定器角色密切相关.我们认为之前单纯以利润取向的银行业效率评价研究高估了国有银行的无效率性,并给出了未来改革建议.该研究为银行利润效率研究提供了新的研究范式,并对国有商业银行的改革方向提供实证依据.

We provide the DEA estimation of Farrell-Type profit efficiency model to evaluate the profit efficiency on 130 Chinese Banks from 2014 to 2016.We identify the sources of efficiency as revenue effect and cost effect.Then we analyze the heterogenous behavior based on different ownership.We find that the heterogenous effect is significant:State-owned banks are most inefficient and shareholding banks are most efficient.From the decomposition and regression,we conclude that the source of inefficiency in state-owned banks mainly comes from the revenue effect.Previous studies overestimate the inefficiency of state-owned banks.This research provides a new framework of bank-efficiency analysis and evidences to bank reform.