控股股东股权质押与企业短债长用

Controlling Shareholder’s Shares Pledge and Short-term Debt for Long-term Use

基于2003—2020年中国上市公司面板数据,本文发现控股股东股权质押显著加剧了企业的短债长用水平,其机理在于控股股东质押会导致企业风险水平上升,这促使银行通过缩短贷款期限来规避自身风险,但企业来自供应商的商业信用则没有发生明显变化。投融资期限的错配在银企关系更弱、信息透明度较低、股权制衡较差以及质押平仓风险较高的公司中更为明显。进一步研究发现,短债长用不仅加剧了股权质押对企业盈利能力的负向影响,与之相伴的流动性风险还提高了企业的违约风险。本文从一个新的角度检验了控股股东股权质押产生的经济后果,对规范股东质押行为、理解短债长用的微观形成机制,以及提高银行信贷决策质量具有重要的启示意义。

By using a panel data which includes Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2020,this paper finds that controlling shareholder’s shares pledge significantly intensifies the level of short-term debt for long-term use.The potential mechanism is that shares pledge increases firm’s risk,and bank will choose to cut loan term in order to tackle with the risk.However,the change of trade credit provided by suppliers is insignificant.The maturity mismatch of debt and investment is more prominent in the subsample that has weak bank-firm relationship,low information transparency,fragile power balance and high risk of closeout.This paper also finds that short-term debt for long-term strengthens pledge’s negative impact on firm’s profitability,and concomitant liquidity risk further intensifies default risk.This paper examines the economic consequence of shares pledge from a new angle and is beneficial to standardize controlling shareholder’s shares pledge,understand the micro mechanism of short-term debt for long-term use and improve the quality of credit policy.