摘要
R&D补贴是当今世界各国推进本国创新、参与全球技术竞争、占领技术前沿制高点的重要产业政策,但关于适宜采用R&D补贴的经济阈限、R&D补贴的最优规模,以及实施R&D补贴的有效模式等核心问题依然缺乏系统性的理论建构。鉴于此,本文从技术外溢视角出发,将R&D补贴嵌入到R&D竞争框架内,构建理论模型系统阐释R&D补贴的上述相关问题,同时使用产业层面的数据进行实证分析。研究发现:给定技术溢出水平,只有当其他经济条件处在补贴阈限内时才需要R&D补贴;当需要补贴时存在一个最优的R&D补贴规模;R&D补贴绩效会随着经济条件的变化发生反转;"普惠式"补贴与"竞争式"补贴有各自的优势区间。中国的R&D补贴总体有效,高技术产业的补贴绩效尤为显著;税收优惠政策对企业R&D投资的带动作用要优于直接的财政补贴。
It is now a common practice that the government will support private innovative activities in every industrialized country,so firms often apply for research grants,and agencies choose research fields that are likely to be funded by the government.As the market cannot provide enough incentives to firms,the government subsidizes the firms to conduct their innovative activities(Nelson,1959;Arrow,1962).Positive external factors that affect other firms and consumers can make the revenue of firm R&D investment less than that of society,so the scale of private R&D investment is less than the optimal scale of social R&D investment.This is the so-called market failure in firm R&D investment,which has become a consensus.Therefore,public sectors of all industrialized countries spend a considerable amount of money to support commercial R&D activities.Despite the popularity of policy incentives,the evidence on the effects of public programs on firms’innovation behavior and performance remains mixed and controversial.According to Zuniga-Vicente et al.(2014),63%of recent firm-oriented studies find that public R&D subsidies boost firms’own R&D expenditures,while the rest find that there is either a crowding out effect or no effect at all.Although a number of recent studies about the effects of public subsidies and innovation have emerged in China,like its foreign counterparts,no consensus has been reached.As for modes of R&D subsidies,tax incentives and direct funding are two main policy instruments currently used in many countries.Despite the long history of direct public funding for private R&D,tax incentives have spread gradually across countries.OECD estimates of the relative weight of each instrument as a share of GDP in 2015 show that Japan and Australia rely mostly on tax incentives,America and Russia depend mostly on direct funding,but the ROK and Austria use both instruments in nearly the same proportion simultaneously.The central government and local governments in China have long paid much attention to inspiring firms to invest in R&D.Although R&D subsidies are one of the main policies for many countries to stimulate domestic innovation and enter global technology competition,no systematic theory has been able to explain core questions of R&D subsidies such as the threshold,optimal scale and efficient mode of R&D subsidies.Therefore,the research of R&D subsidy strategies has great theoretical and practical significance.In this view,from Arrow’s(1962)perspective of technology spillovers,this paper built a subsidy model on R&D competition by following Loury(1979).This model has three innovations.(1)It put the spillover effect into the R&D competition framework,which helped solve overinvestment in R&D mentioned by Loury.(2)It added the variable of government R&D subsidy.(3)It used an explicit function of R&D efficiency,which helped analyze the relationships among variables.After theoretical analysis,this paper used the panel data of 22 Chinese industries to empirically analyze the threshold,performance and mode choice of R&D subsidies.The research findings are as follows.(1)Given the spillover level,only when other economic conditions are in a specific threshold is the subsidy necessary.(2)There exists an optimal scale of subsidy when it is necessary.(3)According to different conditions,the subsidy effect may change from positive to negative.(4)Inclusive subsidy and competitive subsidy have their respective competitive advantages.(5)Chinese R&D subsidies are effective as a whole,but the subsidy intensity is relatively low.Indirective R&D subsidies through tax credit are more effective than directive R&D subsidies through the finance investment of the government.In order to explore the incentive effect of R&D subsidies on corporate technology innovation in a better way,the government should:(1)accurately recognize the threshold of R&D subsidies and identify firms which truly need subsidies;(2)gradually raise the intensity of R&D subsidy,and determine an optimal scale of R&D subsidies;(3)build assessment and adjustment mechanisms of R&D subsidies,and continuously improve the efficiency of R&D subsidies;(4)innovate the mode of R&D subsidies,and optimize the match between the mode of R&D subsidies and firms which are R&D subsidy recipients;and(5)formulate and improve R&D subsidy supporting measures which have complementary and catalysis effects to R&D subsidy policy.
作者
安同良
千慧雄
AN Tongliang;QIAN Huixiong(School of Economics,Nanjing University;Institute of Economics,Jiangsu Provincial Academy of Social Sciences)
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第1期122-137,共16页
Economic Research Journal
基金
家社科基金重大研究专项项目(18VXK002)
中宣部“万人计划”项目的资助