契约执行与关系特定型生产——来自中国的微观证据

Contract Enforcement and Relationship-Specific Production——Micro Evidence from China

在契约执行乏力的制度环境中,企业倾向减少关系特定型产品的比例,以规避潜在的违约风险。本文基于世界银行中国企业调查数据考察了契约执行环境对关系特定型生产的影响,其中关系特定型生产用定制化产品的比例刻画。研究证实:对契约执行缺乏信心的企业,倾向减少定制化产品的比例,以规避机会主义行为的负面影响。这一结论不受控制变量、估计方法和模型内生性的影响。本文研究对于如何营造有利于创新创业的外部制度环境有着重要启示。

In institutional environments where the enforcement of contract cannot be guaranteed,enterprises tend to reduce the proportion of customized products so as to avoid the potential default risk.Armed with China’s firm-level survey data by the World Bank,this paper examines the impact of contract enforcement on relationship-specific production,measured by the proportion of product customization.Our study confirms that,firms lacking confidence in the contract enforcement tend to produce less customized products.This finding holds true regardless of the addition of control variables,the method chosen,and the endogeneity issue.Our study provides solid micro evidence on the impact of institutions on relationship-specific contract,and sheds light on how to foster the institutional environment that facilitates both innovation and entrepreneurship.