去杠杆政策会影响投资者信心吗?

Would the Deleveraging Policy Affect the Confidence of Investors?

去杠杆政策在向下动态调整资本结构时会抑制企业的财务风险和破产风险,但是相伴而生的债权人治理效应弱化却会加剧内部人控制问题。因此,这项政策的实施不仅可能挫伤投资者信心,而且可能在长期内削弱去杠杆政策的执行效果。基于2014—2018年A股非金融类上市公司面板数据,本文运用双重差分(DID)模型实证分析去杠杆对投资者信心的影响,研究表明:去杠杆政策显著挫伤了投资者信心,且该政策效应在机构持股比例低和外部审计质量差的企业样本中更加显著。中介效应检验发现,去杠杆政策通过增加股权代理成本打击投资者信心。同时,调节效应检验发现,独立董事规模在二者关系中起到正向调节作用。据此,在强制性去杠杆政策的执行过程中,应注意到公司内部治理结构所发生的变化,积极主动地采取其他互补措施来监督与制约管理层的败德行为,提振投资者信心。

When adjusting the capital structure,deleveraging policy will reduce the financial and bankruptcy risk of enterprises.However,this will weaken the governance effect of creditors and further aggravate the problem of insider control.Therefore,this deleveraging policy might not only undermine the confidence of investors,but also weaken its policy effect in the long run.Based on the panel data of non-financial listed A-share companies from 2014 to 2018,we use the DID method to analyze the impact of deleveraging on the confidence of investors.The results indicate that the deleveraging policy significantly depresses the confidence of investors.The policy effect is more significant in the companies with lower institutional shareholding ratio and inferior quality of external audit.Tests on intermediary effect show that the deleveraging policy indirectly undermines the confidence of investors by increasing the first type of agency cost of enterprises;the scale of independent directors plays a positive role in regulating the relationship.Therefore,in the process of deleveraging,we should pay attention to the changes in the structure of corporate governance.We also need to implement some complementary measures to supervise and restrain the misbehaviors of managers.