竞争性行业混改中国有资本控制人持股比例与企业绩效

The Controller’s Shareholding Ratio of State-Owned Capital and Corporate Performance in Competitive Industries of Mixed Ownership Reform in China

2013年我国开启了通过发展混合所有制企业,全面推动和深化国有企业改革的新阶段,在分类推进的指导思想下,主业处于充分竞争行业的商业类国有企业混合所有制改革取得了初步成效,而确定国有资本控制人持股比例是混合所有制改革的一个重要环节,这也成为国企改革研究的重要问题之一。本文从控制人持股比例视角出发,分析控制人持股在项目选择决策和自由现金流决策中的作用机制,发现竞争性行业企业控制人项目决策和自由现金流决策对企业绩效的影响随持股比例的变化作用方向完全相反;同时结合国有资本控制人持股的特殊性,提出国有资本控制人最优持股比例理论框架,并以2007—2018年竞争性行业中A股国有资本控制人上市公司为样本,对国有资本控制人最优持股比例进行探究。研究发现,竞争性行业国有资本控股的混合所有制企业,国有资本控制人持股与企业绩效呈现出非线性与阶段线性混合分布的系统特征。当持股比例超过68%的极点阈值时,控制人持股对企业绩效表现为单调的侵害效应,而在低于该阈值的持股区间,又存在着阶段线性差异,42%~68%的国有资本控制人持股比例是现阶段改革实践中较为适合的目标区间。

For commercial state-owned enterprises(SOEs)whose main business is in the fully competitive industries and still need to be controlled by state-owned capital(SOC),how to determine the appropriate shareholding ratio of state-owned controller in mixed ownership reform is an important issue that needs to be resolved in practice.The shareholding ratio of a controller essentially reflects the company’s equity concentration.The greater the shareholding ratio,the higher the equity concentration,the greater the controller’s control over the enterprise and the greater the cash flow right to return operating profits.Whether there is a systematic relationship between the controller’s shareholding ratio(CSR)and corporate performance,the previous studies have conducted a lot of research on the basis of the principal agency theory.Although whether there is a systematic relationship between the CSR and corporate performance has been corroborated by relevant studies,the research of Chinese scholars generally supports that the CSR is systematically related to corporate performance,but it shows an inverted U-shaped,U-shaped,Monotonic linearity or phase linearity is different.This paper believes that the previous research conclusions that show multiple distributions are caused by the fact that existing researchers do not distinguish between the attributes of corporate controllers and ignore the differences between industries.Because of the different industries and governance models,the degree of separation between control rights and cash flow rights reflected by the shareholding ratio are different,and the degree of influence on strategic decisions such as corporate governance and project selection must also be in different way.The CSR can determine the company control rights and reflect the size of the ownership represented by cash flow rights.While the controller has controlled the enterprise,as the ratio decreases,the degree of separation of control and cash flow rights becomes higher,resulting in different project choices and different free cash flow usage methods,which affects the performance of the enterprise.Project selection and free cash flow decision-making are two ways and channels by which the controller’s shareholding ratio affects the company’s performance.With the change of the CSR,the project choices made by the controller and the free cash flow decision have completely opposite effects on corporate performance.While the proportion of SOC holdings decreases,it is necessary to balance the mutually exclusive effects of project selection decisions and free cash flow decisions on corporate performance to maximize corporate performance.Therefore,a simple high-or low-proportion shareholding will not be the optimal shareholding ratio of the SOC controller.This paper takes the A-share state-controlled listed companies in competitive industries from 2007 to 2018 as a sample.The sum of the top five largest shareholders of the company’s SOC holdings measures the CSR,the shareholding ratio of SOC controllers and corporate performance validation of empirical data is carried out in the system association.The study found that,in a mixed-ownership enterprise controlled by SOC in competitive industries,the shareholding ratio of SOC controllers and enterprise performance show a systemic characteristic of nonlinear and phase-linear mixed distribution.When the shareholding ratio exceeds the extreme threshold of 68%,the controller’s shareholding ratio has a monotonous infringement effect on the company’s performance.In the shareholding range below this threshold,there is a linear difference in stages,42%-68%,the shareholding ratio of SOC controllers is a more suitable target range in the current reform practice.