混合所有制改革能化解国有企业产能过剩吗?

Can Mixed Ownership Reform Resolve the Overcapacity of SOEs?

产能高效利用是微观企业乃至国民经济高质量发展的核心要求,如何有效化解国有企业的产能过剩现象成为新时代供给侧结构性改革和深化国有企业混合所有制改革的关键环节。本文从股权制衡与高层治理两个维度,研究混合所有制改革背景下非国有股东治理对国有企业产能利用程度的影响作用。研究发现:非国有股东参与国有企业高层治理可以缓解国有企业面临的双重委托代理问题,降低过度投资水平和提高经营资产运转效率,进而缓解国有企业的产能过剩现象,表现为产能利用率显著上升,而单纯的股权制衡缺乏相应效果;进一步研究发现,这种治理作用在外部制度环境较好、地方控制和竞争性行业的国有企业中更加明显;有效化解产能过剩后的国有企业经营绩效和市场价值得到显著提升。研究结论不仅支持了全面深化改革背景下改善国有企业治理、促进国有企业高质量发展所进行的积极探索,而且对企业产能过剩和国有企业混合所有制改革的学术研究进行了有益拓展。

Efficient utilization of production capacity is the core requirement for high-quality development of micro-enterprises and even the national economy.Thus,how to effectively resolve the overcapacity phenomenon of state-owned enterprises constitutes a key link in the supply-side structural reform and deepening the mixed ownership reform of SOEs in the new era.In 2017,General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out in the report of the 19 th National Congress of the Communist Party of China that it is necessary to"deepen the reform of state-owned enterprises,develop a mixed ownership economy,and cultivate world-class enterprises with global competitiveness"and"persist in reducing overcapacity,destocking,deleveraging,and reducing cost,make up for shortcomings,optimize the allocation of stock resources,expand high-quality incremental supply,and achieve a dynamic balance of supply and demand."As a key breakthrough in the reform of state-owned enterprises,the purpose of the mixed ownership reform is to introduce non-state shareholders to form a more balanced equity structure and a diversified board structure in state-owned enterprises,improve internal supervision and corporate governance mechanisms,which will ultimately achieve the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises.Therefore,whether the participation of non-state shareholders in the governance of state-owned enterprises can effectively resolve the phenomenon of overcapacity in state-owned enterprises is a very important topic in reform practice and policy optimization.This paper studies the influence of non-state shareholders’governance on the utilization of SOEs’production capacity.It finds that the participation of non-state shareholders in high-level governance of SOEs can alleviate the problem of double principal-agent and significantly reduce the level of over-investment and improve the efficiency of operating assets,thereby resolving the phenomenon of overcapacity in SOEs that is manifested in a significant increase in capacity utilization,while the simple equity balances lack corresponding effects.Further research finds that this kind of governance is more obvious in SOEs with better external institutional environment,local control and competitive industries.Finally,the operating performance and market value of SOEs after the effective elimination of overcapacity has been significantly improved.This paper shows that the participation of non-state shareholders in high-level governance of SOEs has a positive effect on the utilization of production capacity,which not only supports the active exploration of national leader to improve the corporate governance of SOEs and promote the high-quality development,but also provides useful extensions to academic research on the overcapacity of enterprises and the mixed ownership reform in SOEs.Last but not least,the conclusion of this paper shows that national leader might unswervingly push forward the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises.Generally,the investment and operation decisions of state-owned enterprises belong to their daily operation and management.It is difficult for decision-making seniors and relevant supervisors to directly regulate the investment and operation behaviors of state-owned enterprises through external system regulations and macro policy requirements.The conclusions of this article provide a feasible path that through the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises the non-state shareholders who embody market logic have the motivation and ability to participate in the governance of state-owned enterprises,which can alleviate the excessive investment of state-owned enterprises and improve the efficiency of operating assets,thereby resolving the overcapacity of state-owned enterprises to a certain extent and improving the operating performance and market value of state-owned enterprises.This has also provided certain support for improving the market-oriented allocation of capital and labor.