标准必要专利搭售的反垄断辨析——从单一租金原则出发的考量

Analysis on Anti-monopoly of Standard Essential Patent Tying——Considerations from the principle of single rent

对于标准必要专利许可的捆绑搭售是否合法,主流观点通常依据FRAND承诺进行判断。FRAND承诺下,执法者认为标准必要专利与非标准必要专利的捆绑搭售很有可能带来反竞争效果。通过引入单一租金原则的理论可以发现,判断标准必要专利许可的捆绑搭售是否具有反竞争效果,需要先评估搭售专利与被搭售专利之间是否具有互补关系等因素,然后在此基础上判断单一租金原则能否成立。当单一租金原则无法成立时,捆绑搭售行为才会具有反竞争效果。单一租金原则的理论为判断标准必要专利许可的捆绑搭售行为的合法性提供了更为可靠的标准。因此,需要修改现行法规,为执法者在运用单一租金原则的理论提供指引和规则依据。

Regarding whether the bundling of standard essential patent licenses is legal,mainstream opinions are usually judged on the basis of FRAND commitments.Under the FRAND commitment,the law enforcers believe that the bundling of standard-essential patents and non-standard-essential patents is likely to bring anti-competitive effects.By introducing the theory of the single rent principle,it can be found that to determine whether the bundling of standard-essential patent licenses has an anti-competitive effect,it is necessary to first evaluate whether there is a complementary relationship between the tying patent and the tying patent,and then on this basis Judge whether the principle of single rent can be established.When the principle of single rent cannot be established,bundling will have an anti-competitive effect.The theory of the single rent principle provides a more reliable standard for judging the legitimacy of the bundling of standard-essential patent licenses.Therefore,it is necessary to modify the current laws and regulations to provide guidance and rule basis for law enforcers in applying the theory of the single rent principle.