摘要
复合型电商平台双渠道售后服务是当前平台经济发展的亮点。本文从制造商与电商平台双渠道合作出发,构建制造商主导的主从博弈模型,研究"自营+三方"形式的复合型电商平台双渠道售后服务合作问题,通过对比双渠道分散决策与集中决策,以集中决策利润为基准,设计两部定价契约协调成员利润分配。研究发现:制造商与电商平台集中决策可提高供应链整体利润;两部定价契约可以有效协调成员收益,并且其操作具有灵活性;平台的能力对供应链整体收益提高效果有重要影响。
The dual-channel after-sales service of the composite e-commerce platform is the highlight of the current platform economics development. This paper starts from the dual-channel cooperation between the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform, constructs a master-slave game model led by the manufacturer, and studies the dual-channel after-sales service cooperation of the compound e-commerce platform in the form of "self-operating + tripartite". By comparing dual-channel decentralized decision-making and centralized decision-making, based on the profit of centralized decision-making, two pricing contracts are designed to coordinate the profit distribution of members. The result shows that: centralized decision-making between manufacturers and e-commerce platforms can increase the overall profit of the supply chain;two pricing contracts can effectively coordinate the revenue of members, and their operations are flexible;the capabilities of the platform have a significant impact on the overall revenue improvement effect of the supply chain.
出处
《价格理论与实践》
北大核心
2020年第11期132-135,184,共5页
Price:Theory & Practice
基金
黑龙江省属高校基本科研业务费项目“‘竞合’背景下黑龙江省制造业创新、转型和产业升级”(KYYWF10236190125)
黑龙江省大学生创新创业训练计划项目“基于社交经济的商业模式创新研究与实践”(202010236040)
黑龙江省艺术规划项目“基于‘互联网+文化产业’的黑龙江艺术品流通体系构建研究”(项目编号:2017C001)
关键词
复合型电商平台
制造商
双渠道售后服务
两部定价契约
composite e-commerce platform
manufacturer
dual-channel after-sales service
two pricing contracts