“行政行为”与“权利”背后的理论立场——评“许山河案”

The Theoretical Stands Behind"Administrative Action"and"Right":On"Xu Shanhe Case"

许山河因海南省社科联的决定而丧失参评正高三级的资格,但却被行政诉讼拒之门外。法院的这种做法虽然符合行政诉讼的一贯做法,但却有悖于行政行为和权利这两个概念背后的理论预设。一方面,行政行为的深层支撑是权威式支配,但基于利害的支配也会向这种支配过渡,条件是支配者在特定的领域获得独占性的地位。海南省社科联的独占性地位意味着其决定属于行政行为的范畴。另一方面,在法律理论与实践中,应当坚持一种形而上学的权利立场,而非一种实证主义的权利立场,即权利先于法律与国家。这意味着未被法律规定为实证法意义上的权利(主观权利)也具有获得法律保护的可能性。因此,法院应当受理"许山河案"。

Xu Shanhe was disqualified as a professor at the third level due to the decision of the Hainan Federation of Humanities and Social Sciences Circles(HFHSSC),and was turned away by administrative litigation.Although this approach of the court is consistent with the usual practice of administrative litigation,it runs counter to the theoretical presupposition behind the two concepts of administrative action and right.On the one hand,the deep support of administrative action is authoritative control,but interest-based control will also transition to such control,provided that the governor obtains an exclusive status in a specific field.The exclusive status of HFHSSC means that its decision belongs to the scope of administrative action.On the other hand,in legal theory and practice,a metaphysical right stand should be adhered to,instead of a positivist right stand,that right precede law and the state.This means that right(subjective right)that are not prescribed by law as positive law also have the possibility of obtaining legal protection.Therefore,the court should accept the"Xu Shanhe case".