东北国企混改中不同性质股东的行为演化和效率影响

Different Nature Shareholders’Behavior Evolution and Efficiency Influence in the Reform of Mixed Ownership of Northeast State-Owned Enterprises

竞争中立、营商环境与国企改革三者具有内在的契合性。本文基于东北国有企业混合所有制改革的困境和难点,对东北特色营商环境下不同产权性质股东在混合所有制改革中的行为进行了建模,分别从股东的完全理性和不完全理性假设出发,用静态均衡和演化均衡两种范式分析了正式的自上而下的政策制度和非正式的自下而上的习惯特征对股东的生产性合作和非生产性侵占(及防范)产生的相对报酬或激励结构,刻画了东北国有企业混合所有制改革的纳什均衡、演化均衡及效率特征,提出了相应的政策建议。

Competitive neutral,business environment and the reform of state-owned enterprises have an inherent fit.Based on the dilemma and difficulties of the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in Northeast China,this paper models the behavior of shareholders with different property rights in the mixed reform under the northeast characteristic business environment.With the assumptions of complete rationality and incomplete rationality of shareholders separately,two paradigms of both static equilibrium and evolutionary equilibrium are used to analyze how the formal top-down policy system and the informal bottom-up behavior effect the productive cooperation and non-productive invasion of the shareholders.The conducted relative return and inspiration structure will be quoted to depict the efficiency and characteristics of the mixed ownership reform,and then forward corresponding policy recommendations can be proposed.