外部薪酬差距与高管减持

External Pay Gap and Executives′Selling

近年来,中国上市公司高管减持引起了投资者、监管当局、媒体和社会公众的强烈关注。尽管学术界对高管减持动机进行了多角度考察,但仍存在诸多未知因素亟需探索。以高管薪酬视角探索外部薪酬差距对高管减持的影响,有助于全面认识外部薪酬差距的经济后果,也有助于监管当局对高管减持行为实施精准监管,具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。基于管理层权力理论和有效契约理论,实证检验外部薪酬差距对高管减持的影响,从产权性质和会计信息透明度两个方面进行异质性分析,并进一步考察外部薪酬差距对高管机会主义减持的影响。选择2007年至2021年中国A股上市公司作为研究样本,构建多元回归模型,采用Heckman两阶段模型法和倾向得分匹配法控制可能的内生性问题,并进行稳健性检验以保证结论的可靠性。研究结果表明,外部薪酬差距与高管减持显著正相关,且在会计信息透明度较差的上市公司中更为显著,在国有上市公司和非国有上市公司中未呈现显著差异。稳健性检验表明结果稳健可靠。在拓展性检验中发现,相较于薪酬低于行业薪酬中位数的高管,薪酬高于行业薪酬中位数的高管更可能实施机会主义减持,并且外部薪酬差距越大,高管实施机会主义减持的频率和规模也越大。结果表明外部薪酬差距是驱动高管减持的重要因素,同时驱动了高管机会主义减持。研究结果丰富和拓展了薪酬差距经济后果的理论研究,有助于理解薪酬差距在高管减持决策中发挥的作用。为中国证监会等监管机构更具针对性地制定有关高管减持的监管政策提供理论支持和经验证据,对于引导高管有序减持进而维护资本市场稳定具有重要的现实意义。为制定公平分配收入的政策和举措、培育和完善职业经理人市场、建立合理的经理才能发现机制以及制定薪酬机制提供决策参考。

Executives′selling in Chinese listed companies has raised strong concerns from investors,regulatory authorities,social media,and the public in recent years.Although academia has researched the motivation of executives′selling from different perspectives,many unknown factors still need to be explored thoroughly and deeply.Exploring the impact of the external pay gap on executives′selling from the perspective of executive pay,which has important theoretical value and practical significance,will help to fully understand the economic consequences of the external pay gap and the regulatory authorities′accurate supervision of executives′selling.Based on the management power theory and the effective contract theory,this study empirically tests the effect of the external pay gap on executives′selling,analyzes the heterogeneity from the nature of property rights and the transparency of accounting information,and further examines the impact of the external pay gap on executives′opportunistic selling.Researchers select Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021 as the research samples,construct a multiple regression model,use the Heckman two-stage model and propensity score matching method to control the possible endogenous problems,and conduct a series of robustness tests to ensure the reliability of the conclusions.The study found that the external pay gap was significantly and positively related to executives′selling.This positive correlation was more significant among listed companies with poor transparency and did not show significant differences between state-owned listed companies and non-state-owned listed companies.After a series of robustness tests,the results are robust and reliable.In the extensive test,it was found that compared to executives whose salaries were lower than the industry median,executives whose salaries were higher than the industry median were more likely to engage in opportunistic selling.Moreover,as the external pay gap enlarged,the frequency and scale of opportunistic selling would also increase.Therefore,the external pay gap was the influencing factor that drove executives′selling and carried out opportunistic selling.This study enriches and expands the theoretical research on the economic consequences of the pay gap.It also helps to understand the role of the pay gap in executives′selling decisions.This study provides theoretical support and empirical evidence for CSRC and other regulatory institutions to formulate more targeted policies on executives′selling,which is significant for safeguarding minority shareholders and promoting the healthy development of the capital market.It also provides decisionmaking reference to formulate fair policies for income distribution,cultivate and improve the professional manager market,and establish a reasonable manager talent discovery mechanism and pay-formulation mechanism.