非控股国有股权与民营企业税收负担

Non-controlling State Ownership and Tax Burden in Private Firms

随着混合所有制改革的推进,在政策层“鼓励国有资本以多种方式入股非国有企业”的背景下,国有资本入股民营企业的“反向混改”案例逐渐普遍且呈增长之势。考察国有资本影响民营企业经营和治理的机理和路径,系统评价国有资本参股民营企业的经济效果,对于完善和发展中国特色混合所有制经济具有重要的理论和现实意义。然而,已有研究主要关注国有企业引入民营资本的混改模式,关于国有资本入股民营企业的“反向混改”的研究较为匮乏,因此亟须更多的研究关注“反向混改”的模式、治理效应和经济后果。结合国有资本参股民营企业的制度背景,基于企业税收负担视角,运用2009年至2020年沪深A股民营上市企业的数据,研究非控股国有股权对民营企业税收负担的影响,进一步探讨税收征管强度和高管政治关联对非控股国有股权与民营企业税收负担二者关系的调节效应,从企业税收优惠和税收规避激进度两个方面考察非控股国有股权影响民营企业税收负担的作用机制。研究结果表明,首先,非控股国有股权能显著减轻民营企业税收负担。其次,相对于税收征管强度较低的地区,非控股国有股权对民营企业税收负担的减轻作用在税收征管强度较高的地区更显著;相对于具有政治关联的民营企业,非控股国有股权对企业税收负担的减轻作用在无政治关联的民营企业中更显著。最后,非控股国有股权主要帮助民营企业获得更多的税收优惠,而不是促使企业开展激进的税收规避行为减轻税收负担。民营企业通过让渡一定的股权给国有股东,能够建立一定的政治联系,从而在经营过程中获得更多的政府优惠政策。研究结果丰富了混合所有制改革与企业税收的相关研究,有助于理解国有资本影响民营企业经营和治理的机理和路径,为进一步发展中国特色混合所有制经济提供了更多的理论和经验证据,对于减轻民营企业税收负担、促进民营企业持续健康发展和营造公平的市场竞争环境提供一定的政策启示。

With the implementation of mixed-ownership reform,and given the context of diverse policy the Chinese government has been motivating state-owned capitals to invest in the non-state-owned enterprises,the phenomenon of state-owned capitals invest in private firms is prevalent and still in increase in China.By investigating how state-owned capitals influence the operation and the governance of private firms,and systematically evaluating the related economic consequences,this study can shed light on the improvement and development of the mixed-ownership economy in China.However,the prior literature mainly explores the pattern of non-state-owned capitals investing in state-owned enterprises(SOEs),and the research on the pattern of state-owned capitals investing in private firms is relatively scarce.Therefore,it is required that more papers examine the pattern of state-owned capitals investing in private firms and the related governance effects and economic consequences.Under the institutional background of the mixed-ownership reform in which state-owned capitals invest in private firms,and from the perspective of corporate tax burden,this study researches how the non-controlling state ownership affects the tax burden of private firms,using a sample of listed private firms in the Chinese A-share market from 2009 to 2020.We further examine whether the tax enforcement and political relationship influence the association between non-controlling state ownership and tax burden in private firms.We finally examine whether non-controlling state ownership influences private firms′tax burden by the channels of tax preferences or tax evasion.We find that,non-controlling state ownership helps to lessen the tax burden of private firms.Compared to the private firms in regions with weak tax enforcement,the above lessening effect is more salient for private firms in regions with strong tax enforcement;Compared to the private firms with political relationship,the above lessening effect is stronger for private firms without political relationship.Finally,non-controlling state ownership reduces the tax burden of private firms mainly through helping the firms obtain more tax preferences,rather than conducting more tax evasions.Overall,our results suggest that private firms can build some kind of political relationships by selling some shares to the state-owned shareholders,which can further help private firms obtain more preference policies from the government in the business process.This study enriches the literature on the mixed-ownership reform and corporate taxation,helps us understand the mechanisms and paths of state-owned capitals influencing the operation and governance of private firms,and offers some valuable evidences for the development of the Chinese mixed-ownership economy.More importantly,this study also has valuable implications for reducing the tax burden of private firms,promoting the sustainable and healthy development of private firms and creating a much fairer market competition environment in China.