期刊文献+

科创板差异化表决权结构下的利益冲突与应对进路

Interest Conflicts and Regulation Response of Differentiated Voting Rights in Science and Technology Innovation Board
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摘要 随着新经济和高新科技的发展,差异化表决权结构成为众多创始人化解融资需求和控制权稀释困境的最佳选择。2019年1月和2019年3月,中国证监会、上海证券交易所出台文件表明允许科技创新企业发行具有特别表决权类别股份,这一举动表明我国突破传统"一股一权"原则,引进差异化表决权架构。诚然,美国对差异化表决权结构的研究已经较成熟,但发达资本市场的监管模式或许无法适用于新兴资本市场。一味地借鉴美国经验并不能开出真正适合中国的药方。所以,本文选取了中国香港特别行政区、新加坡两个同类新兴亚洲资本市场作为研究对象,通过对差异化表决权结构下内外各方利益主体间的冲突进行分析,结合差异化表决权的实践,试图提出完善科创板差异化表决权结构的思路。
作者 鲁斯齐
机构地区 华东政法大学
出处 《投资者》 2020年第1期26-50,共25页 Investor
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二级参考文献47

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