高管激励对企业经营绩效的影响研究

A Study on Impact of Executive Incentive on Enterprise Operating Performance

文章以制造业A股上市公司2015-2017年的数据为研究样本,研究不同所有权性质下高管激励、股权集中度与企业经营绩效的关系。研究结果显示:高管薪酬激励能够促进企业经营绩效的提高,在非国有制造企业中影响更显著;高管股权激励与企业经营绩效正相关,在国有制造企业中影响更显著;股权集中度在国有制造企业中对高管薪酬激励与企业经营绩效的关系有负向调节作用,在非国有制造企业中调节作用不显著;股权集中度在国有制造企业中对高管股权激励与企业经营绩效关系的调节作用不显著,在非国有制造企业中有负向调节作用。

The data of manufacturing A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2017 is taken as the research sample,focusing on the relationship among the executive incentives,the ownership concentration and the enterprise operating performance with different ownership natures.The results show that the executive salary incentive can promote the improvement of the enterprise operating performance,especially the non-state-owned manufacturing enterprises.The executive stock ownership incentive is positively correlated with the enterprise operating performance,which has a more significant impact on the state-owned manufacturing enterprises.The ownership concentration has a negative moderating effect on the relationship between the executive salary incentive and the enterprise operating performance in the state-owned manufacturing enterprises,but not in the non-state-owned manufacturing enterprises.The ownership concentration has no significant moderating effect on the relationship between the executive stock ownership incentive and the enterprise operating performance in state-owned manufacturing enterprises but has a negative moderating effect on the non-state-owned manufacturing enterprises.