退溪“四端七情论”:一个现象学的考察

Toegye’s Arguments on the Four Beginnings and Seven Emotions: A Phenomenological Inquiry

本文从现象学的视角,对退溪的"四端七情论",从"奠基"和"他者性"两个维度进行了理论重构,着重剖析了退溪"四端"与"七情"之间的关系和差异。"四端"是"奠基"的基底,而"七情"则是建造在"四端"之上的"非奠基之情"。即便"四端"和"七情"都是以"他者性"和"主体间性"为自己的出发点,但是,"四端"强调的是"理为先、气随之",而"七情"则是"气先发、理乘之";在面对他者的时候,会面临"道义与私人爱欲孰先孰后"的选择偏好问题,"四端"强调"道义为先",因此是"纯善"的;而"七情"则可能会更多受到"私人爱欲"的影响,故而表现出"可善可恶"的两面性。

This article aims to phenomenologically examine Toegye’s arguments on the Four Beginnings(siduan)and Seven Emotions(qiqing),attempting a theoretical reconstruction through"founding"and"alterity",so as to reveal the relations and differences between siduan and qiqing.On the one hand,siduan constitutes a founding substratum,on the top of which qiqing may be founded.Moreover,whereas siduan and qiqing share the same assumption of alterity or intersubjectivity,they differ in their emphasis on whether li(principle)or qi(physical force)shall be prioritised.The priority of li over qi is inherent in the notion of siduan,while for qiqing,it is the other way around.When confronted by an"other",one will invariably face a choice to make,in"deontological consideration of the other’s interest"or"private preference".There is an emphasis that"deontological consideration shall prevail"in siduan,for which it is"purely good".By way of comparison,qiqing may be affected more often than not by"private desire or preference",for which reason it will manifest the Janus faces of being both good and evil.