摘要
集体讨论制度作为一项决策机制,被我国公权力结构体系广泛运用,在监察法领域表现为监察机关重要事项集体研究制度。监察机关重要事项集体研究兼具组织法与行为法的双重法律属性,分别对应“民主集中制”与“行政过程论”的二元理论基础。立足现行监察法制,可以析出监察机关重要事项集体研究的基本类型、适用范围及行为模式等制度要素。因监察体制改革初期采取“宜粗不宜细”的立法策略,监察机关重要事项集体研究制度面临着程序规则不足、责任后果缺失等规范漏洞与“团体迷失”的实践隐忧。对此,可以从明晰程序要素、确立责任追究与后续处理机制、构建“团队迷失”现象的多元防范机制等方面进行制度优化。
The collective discussion system,as a decision-making mechanism,is widely used in China's public power structure system and is manifested as a collective research system for important matters of supervisory organs in the field of supervisory law.Collective research on important matters of supervisory organs has dual legal attributes of organizational law and behavioral law,corresponding to the dual theoretical foundations of“democratic centralism”and“administrative process theory”.Based on the current supervisory legal system,the basic types,scope of application,and behavioral patterns of collective research on important matters of supervisory organs can be identified.Due to the legislative strategy of“coarse rather than fine”adopted in the early stage of the reform of the supervisory system,the collective research system for important matters of supervisory organs faces regulatory loopholes such as insufficient procedural rules and lack of responsibility and consequences,as well as practical concerns of“group loss”.In this regard,institutional optimization can be carried out by clarifying procedural elements,establishing accountability and follow-up mechanisms,and constructing a diversified prevention mechanism for the phenomenon of“team loss”.
作者
喻少如
唐成余
YU Shao-ru;TANG Cheng-yu(Discipline Inspection and Supervision School,Southwest University of Political Science and Law,Chongqing 401120,China)
出处
《河北法学》
北大核心
2024年第8期40-57,共18页
Hebei Law Science
基金
教育部哲学社会科学重大课题攻关项目“全面依法治国视域下司法行政职能定位及作用发挥问题研究”(20JZD021)
重庆市教委人文社会科学研究项目“破解大党独有难题的党内法规制度路径研究”(24SKJD007)
关键词
民主集中制
重要事项集体研究
国家监察体制
监察程序
democratic centralism
collective discussion
supervisory system
supervision procedures