我国司法改革的内卷化风险及其治理

The Risk of Involution of China’s Judicial Reform and Its Governance

受制于一系列主客观因素,我国司法改革正在面临内卷化风险。这表现为司法改革往往只能在既定框架下对有限领域展开审时度势、持续不断的调整;尽管改革在相关领域取得显著的成效,却难以完全实现预期目标,改革因成效不均衡而无法全面深化。从根源来看,我国司法改革过程中司法独特性与政治统一性博弈形成的角色约束,“地方试点主义”与“政治锦标赛”叠加而成的竞争倾向,领导决策与政治动员结合产生的行政主导共同型塑并强化了内卷化风险。治理内卷化风险,必须打破角色约束,避免将司法改革作为缓解体制改革压力的制度性工具,并从制度上充分回应司法需求;限制竞争倾向,降低试点的随意性与偶然性,提倡有序试点和理性竞争;破除行政主导,保障依法推进、扩大多元参与、提倡增量改革。

Subject to a series of subjective and objective factors,China’s judicial reform is facing the risk of involution.This shows that the judicial reform can only take place in limited areas deliberately and continuously under the established framework;Although the reform has achieved remarkable results in certain fields,it is arduous to fully achieve the expected goals,and the reform cannot be comprehensively deepened because of its unbalanced effect.The“role constraint”formed by the collision of judicial uniqueness and political unity,the“competitive tendency”formed by the superposition of“local experimentalism”and“political tournament”,and the“leadership dominance”produced by the combination of leadership decision-making and political mobilization in the process of China’s judicial reform jointly shape and strengthen the risk of involution.In order to manage the risk of involution,we must break the“role constraint”,avoid taking judicial reform as an institutional tool to relieve the pressure of system reform,and fully respond to the special needs of judicial system;We must limit the“competitive tendency”,reduce the randomness and contingency of the pilot,advocate orderly pilot and rational competition;We should abolish the“leadership dominance”approach,ensure law-based progress,expand diverse participation,and advocate incremental reform.