冲突后权力分享与联合国选举援助的成效——以布隆迪与科特迪瓦为例

同样是联合国针对冲突后国家举行首次大选的选举援助项目,为什么有的促成东道国冲突各方的民主和解,有的却无法阻止冲突复发?既有研究侧重联合国的超主权干预、安理会制裁与国际组织选举观念教育等因素,忽视了联合国选举援助的维和效应。本文发现,联合国选举援助通过“舞弊风险规避”和“国际声誉压力”的机制路径,可以帮助受援国落实战后权力分享协议,但其有效性取决于受援国国内权力分享的可置信环境。具体而言,在受援国国内冲突各方存在可置信权力分享协议的条件下,联合国选举援助可以帮助受援国在冲突后大选中实现民主和解;而在受援国国内权力分享协议面临可置信承诺困境时,联合国选举援助的有效性便会大打折扣。

Why do the same UN electoral assistance programs that target the first general elections in postconflict countries succeed in promoting democratic reconciliation,while others fail?The role of UN electoral assistance in electoral reconciliation in post-conflict countries has been overlooked by studies that focus on factors such as supra-sovereign UN intervention,Security Council sanctions,and education of international organizations on electoral perceptions.1 find that UN electoral assistance can help implement post-war power-sharing agreements through causal mechanisms of“fraud risk aversion”and“international reputational pressure,”but constraint by the domestic political ecology that favorable for credible environment of power-sharing.Specifically,UN electoral assistance can promote peace by post-conflict elections when credible power-sharing agreements exist,but fail while it absence.