摘要
经济学中的传讯机制可以用于解释科举制度。从这个角度来看,科举实际上是一套以特定指标传递的、用于人才选拔的"第三者机制"。清末停废科举以后,这套传讯机制中断,官方与民众的互动方式发生了巨大改变,由此引起一系列后果:一方面,新的传讯指标与以往大不相同,甚至很多时候处于模糊未知的状态,成为新精英的管道变得不可预测,而横向的传讯机制则有所发展;另一方面,科举的传讯功能也并未完全失效,功名可以转化成社会声望,并与其他的传讯渠道互相竞合。总的来说,科举停废使社会失去了公认的人才标准,多元竞合的传讯机制则进一步使精英的身份不易识别,这些问题都可以成为未来思想史研究的新课题。
The term"signaling system"in economics can be used to explain the imperial examination system.From this point of view,the imperial examination was actually a set of"third party mechanism"transmitted by specific indicators and used for selection of talents.After the imperial examination system was abolished,this signaling system was suddenly interrupted,and the interaction between the government and the people was greatly changed.This caused a series of consequences:on the one hand,the new signals were very different from the past,and even in many cases they were vaguely unknown.The way of becoming a new elite became unpredictable,and the horizontal signaling system developed.On the other hand,the signaling function of the imperial examination had not been completely invalidated.The fame can be transformed into social prestige and can be combined with other signaling.To sum up,abolition of the imperial examinations had caused society to lose the common standards of talents,and the coopetition of multiple signaling systems further made it difficult to identify elites.These questions can all become new topics in the future study of Chinese intellectual history.
作者
王汎森
Wang Fansen(Institute of History and Philology,Academia Sinica,Taiwan,China)
出处
《复旦学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第2期51-60,共10页
Fudan Journal(Social Sciences)
关键词
传讯机制
科举停废
思想史
signaling system
abolition of imperial examinations
history of thought