基于需求响应的分时电价主从博弈建模与仿真研究

Modelling and Simulation Study of TOU Stackelberg Game Based on Demand Response

为实现提高供电方收益,同时减少用电方支出及减小峰谷差的目的,建立了以供电方为强势方、用电方为弱势方的主从博弈模型,提出了一种最优分时电价策略。首先考虑用户满意度与电力波动成本建立了供电方收益目标函数和用电方收益方目标函数。然后,通过决策变量映射集技术将模型中的变量分到博弈双方策略集。接着,先由弱势方跟随强势方以自身目标函数最优对自身策略空间进行优化,强势方根据弱势方的跟随对策以自身目标函数最优为目标对自身策略空间进行优化,并由所有的优化结果组成新的博弈策略组合,经过多轮博弈得到博弈均衡解。根据主从博弈特点,作为强势方的供电方将得到较高的收益和满意度,作为弱势方的支出也能得到一定程度的降低。

In order to increase the revenue of power supplier and reduce the expenditure of electricity customer and peak-valley difference,a Stackelberg game model with the power supplier as dominant party and the electricity customer as disadvantaged party is established to formulate optimal time-of-use pricing.Firstly,considering customer satisfaction and power fluctuation cost,objective functions of power supplier’s revenue and electricity customer’s expenditure are established in the model.Then,the variables in the model are divided into the strategy sets of both sides of the game through the mapping set of decision variables.Then,the disadvantaged party follows the dominant party to optimize its own strategy space with its own optimum objective function as the goal.Then the dominant party optimizes its own strategy space with its own optimum objective function as the goal according to the disadvantaged party’s follow-up strategy.A new combination of game strategies is formed with all the optimization results,and the game equilibrium solution is obtained through multi-round game.According to the characteristics of Stackelberg game,the power supplier as the dominant party will get higher income and satisfaction,and the expenditure of the disadvantaged party will also be reduced in some extent.Computation examples verify above conclusion.