对康德知觉判断与经验判断区分的辩护

The Defense of the Distinction between Kant’s Perceptual Judgment and Empirical Judgment

康德对知觉判断与经验判断的区分通常被学者视作两版演绎间的过渡产物,且与第二版演绎存在矛盾;然而他在事实上一直沿用这种区分。虽然也有少数学者为之辩护,但只有从文本的事实性、必要性和不矛盾性三方面着眼,才能为这种区分提供全面而充分的辩护。具体而言,《任何一种能够作为科学出现的未来形而上学导论》中的这个区分并不是演绎,而是构成演绎的一个“预习”,并且它在《纯粹理性批判》中以不同的表述被保留下来。此外,演绎中的判断定义只属于认识判断,而知觉判断符合广义的判断定义,并且其中的准经验判断才属此区分,而情感判断则要归于审美判断的领域。这为学者揭示了一个更丰富的康德判断理论。

Kant’s distinction between perceptual judgment and empirical judgment is generally regarded as the transitional product between two versions of deduction by scholars,and there are contradictions with the second version of deduction;however,he has always used this distinction in fact.Although there are also a small number of scholars to defend it,only from the perspective of the fact,necessity and non contradiction of the text,can we provide a comprehensive and full defense for this distinction.Specifically,this distinction in the introduction is not deduction,but a preview of deduction,and it is preserved in the criticism with different expressions.In addition,the definition of judgment in deduction only belongs to cognitive judgment,while perceptual judgment conforms to the definition of judgment in a broad sense.And the quasi empirical judgment belongs to this distinction,while the emotional judgment belongs to the field of aesthetic judgment.This reveals a richer Kantian theory of judgment for scholars.