资本市场中介鉴证与并购承诺契约执行:基于东方精工并购普莱德的案例研究

Assurance Provided by Capital Market Intermediaries and Fulfillment of M&A Performance Commitments:A Case Study on the Acquisition of Pride by Dongfang Precision

业绩承诺被广泛应用于并购重组中,涉及交易双方的重大利益,也关联着广大投资者。然而近年来中国资本市场上并购双方因业绩承诺纠纷而诉诸法律的事件屡见不鲜,增加了资本市场的不稳定因素。因此,在业绩承诺订立和执行过程中,资本市场中介的责任愈加重大。立足审计中介视角,本文借助新近发生的东方精工并购普莱德业绩承诺纠纷的案例,探讨了业绩承诺协议中中介鉴证功能的履行、制约和后果。本文研究发现,资本市场中介的鉴证功能可以制约并购契约的执行,且中介鉴证的质量将影响并购契约的执行,而制约作用的失效将带来一系列负面的经济后果。本文展现了中介鉴证对于资本市场交易达成的重要意义,也为业绩承诺条款设置、中介机构风险防范、中小投资者保护以及监管制度完善提供了有益启示。

Having been widely used in mergers and acquisitions(M&As),performance commitment agreements affect the interests of not only the acquisition counterparties,but also the investors.However,the capital market in China has witnessed an increasing number of legal disputes about M&A performance commitment agreements in recent years,which introduces additional sources of instability to the capital market.Therefore,capital market intermediaries play an increasingly important role in signing and fulfilling performance commitment agreements.From the perspective of auditors,we discuss the role of assurance provided by capital market intermediaries in a performance commitment agreement using the recent legal dispute between Dongfang Precision(acquirer)and Pride(target),two counterparties in an acquisition.We find that the assurance provided by capital market intermediaries could constrain the implementation of M&A contract,and the quality of assurance will affect the execution of M&A contract.Besides,the failure of constraining effect brought by assurance will induce a series of negative economic consequences.Our findings not only show the important role of assurance provided by financial intermediaries in capital market transactions,but also provide helpful insights on the arrangement of performance commitment provisions,risk prevention of capital market intermediaries,the protection of minority shareholder interests,and the enhancement of regulatory system.