集权、投资效率与企业绩效

Organizational Centralization,Investment Efficiency and Firm Performance

集权作为一种组织管理控制方式,如何实现合理的管理控制和权力配置从而达到战略的有效执行和落地,对企业而言极为重要。基于A股上市公司参控股子公司的组织架构,本文研究发现:过度集权会导致非效率投资,而且对企业短期和长期绩效都会产生负面影响。市场化水平的提高有利于降低过度集权对投资效率与企业长期绩效的负面影响;过度集权对投资效率与企业长期绩效的负面影响主要存在于民营企业中。本文结论丰富了企业权力配置的研究,增进了对企业内部权力分配的理解,同时对中国企业经营体制完善有一定的现实启示。

Since the degree of organizational centralization is crucial part of organizational management system,a firm needs to appropriately design its managerial hierarchy and allocate its managerial power in order to successfully implement its business strategies.Using the data on the organizational structures of the subsidiaries of A-share listed firms,we study the relations of the degree of organizational centralization to investment efficiency and firm performance.We find that over-centralization leads to lower investment efficiency and thus results in poor short-and long-term firm performance.Moreover,the negative impact is more pronounced in non-stated owned enterprises.However,a higher level of marketization in the region where enterprises have their primary operations attenuates the negative effect.Our findings highlight the role of organizational centralization in corporate performance through the channel of investment policy,and suggest that listed firms in China should take investment policy into account when determining the degree of organizational centralization.