监管问询函能够有效识别代理问题严重的公司吗?——上海证券交易所的经验证据

Can Inquiry Letters Be Used to Effectively Identify Companies Most Plagued by Agency Problems?Evidence from Shanghai Stock Exchange

本文聚焦于证券交易所非行政处罚性监管,以2014~2019年上海证券交易所A股上市企业为样本,实证检验双重代理成本对公司接收问询函概率和频次的影响。研究结果表明:代理问题较严重、代理成本较高的公司,被上海证券交易所出具问询函(财务报告相关的问询函)的可能性更大。产权性质及股权制衡度对前述结果具有异质性影响,在国有企业中第一类代理成本的影响更显著,在股权制衡度较低的公司中第二类代理成本的影响也更显著。机制检验表明,信息透明度是代理成本影响公司接收问询函概率和频次的重要传导途径。本文丰富了问询函制度影响因素的研究,为问询函监管治理机制的有效发挥提供了有效证据。

Using a sample of firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2019 and the implementation of the non-administrative penal regulations of the stock exchange,this paper empirically examines the differential effects of the dual agency problem on the probability and frequency with which a listed company receives inquiry letters.We find that companies suffering from more severe agency problems and thus incurring high agency costs are more likely to receive inquiry letters from the stock exchange,and this result is robust to the use of inquiry letters related to financial reports.The cross-sectional analysis indicates that the nature and structure of ownership introduce heterogeneity in the above effects.Specifically,the first type of agency problem strongly increases the probability that a state-owned enterprise receives inquiry letters,whereas the second type of agency problem increases the probability that an enterprise with a high degree of equity checks and balances receives inquiry letters.Further analysis shows that information transparency serves as a transmission channel in linking the agency problems with the probability and frequency of receiving inquiry letters.This study extends the literature on the factors influencing the issuance of inquiry letters and provides evidence in support of using inquiry letters as indicators for weak corporate governance.