审计委员会—审计师连锁关系与公司盈余质量——来自我国A股上市公司的经验证据

Audit Committee-Auditor Interlocking and Earning Quality:Empirical Evidence from Chinese A-share Listed Companies

本文以2005~2018年我国A股上市公司为样本,研究审计委员会—审计师连锁关系对公司盈余质量的影响。研究发现,连锁关系能显著提高公司的盈余质量,连锁程度越高,盈余质量越好,且审计委员会主任引起的连锁关系能够加强这种正向影响。进一步分析发现,连锁关系能够显著降低股价崩盘风险,且盈余质量在其中起到部分中介作用。本文的研究结论对促进审计委员会提高履职能力、资本市场平稳发展、保护投资者利益具有重要的启示意义。

Using a sample of A-share listed companies in China for the period of 2005-2018,this paper examine the relationship between Audit Committee-Auditor interlocking and earning quality.Our research shows that,AC-Auditor interlocking significantly improves the earning quality,and the earning quality increases with the growth of the interlocking degree.Moreover,AC-Auditor interlocking poses a greater positive impact on earning quality when the interlocking is caused by the chair of audit committee.Further analyses show that,the interlocking significantly reduces the crash risk of stock price,and the earning quality plays a part of mediating role in this mechanism.The conclusion provides new clues for improving the earning quality and promoting a better performance of audit committee.Also the paper has important implications for the development of capital market and investor protection in China.Keywords:audit committee-auditor interlocking;earning quality;stock price crash risk;investor protection.