两职合一还是分离?——制度因素对领导权结构演进的影响分析

Duality or Separation?An Analysis of the Impact of Institutional Environment Factors on the Evolution of Corporate Leadership Structure

主流西方理论将领导权结构视为公司的自由选择,因而在影响因素分析中大都聚焦于微观的公司层面和CEO(chief executive officer,首席执行官)个人层面因素,对宏观的制度因素关注不足;但是,在制度环境快速变化的我国,公司的领导权结构除了受到公司层面因素的约束外,还受到外部制度因素的重要影响。基于此,本文在领导权结构演进的分析中引入制度因素。本文的研究发现,在2002~2018年的近20年间,我国上市公司中的两职合一公司所占的比率(简称两职合一率)出现了显著的上升,多层级资本市场的逐渐开放和更多中小规模年轻公司的进入是重要的原因;受到监管政策的影响,国有上市公司始终维持10%上下的两职合一率,而非国有上市公司则从2002年的14.10%逐步上升到2018年的39.24%,增长了近两倍。进一步的分析表明,相较于管制规则下国有上市公司受到监管政策的严格约束,市场规则下非国有上市公司的领导权结构选择则更多地基于个体特征,是对收益和成本的权衡,这与现有西方文献的研究结果一致。本文的研究揭示了制度因素在我国上市公司领导权结构演进中扮演了重要的角色,在我国讨论两职状态的形成及其经济后果时,不能忽视制度因素的影响。

The mainstream theories in developed markets regard the corporate leadership structure as a free choice of the company.As a result,extant research on the determinants of CEO duality is mostly focused on the micro firm-level or individual-level variables,and directs little attention to the macro institutional environment variables.We observe that the institutional environment in China is constantly changing and the corporate leadership structure of a company is not only affected by firm-level factors,but,to a large extent,by external institutional environment factors.Based on this observation,we hypothesize that institutional environment factors play an important role in the evolution of corporate leadership structure.We find that the proportion of CEO duality in the Chinese listed companies over the last 17 years has substantially increased,which results primarily from the establishement and gradual opening of multi-tier capital markets and from the entry of a growing number of small and medium-sized young companies.Interestingly,the substantial increase in the proportion of CEO duality is attributed to non-state-owned listed companies,for which the proportion of CEO duality is 39.24 percent in 2018,nearly tripling the figure of 14.10 percent in 2002,whereas the proportion of CEO duality for state-owned listed companies has maintained at around 10 percent,due to regulatory restrictions.Further analysis shows that the selection of corporate leadership structure by non-state-owned listed companies,which are free from regulatory restrictions,depends mainly on firm-level characteristics and is an outcome of the trade-off between benefits and costs,consistent with the existing findings from the developed markets.This result stands in constrast to that for state-owned listed companies,which are tightly restricted by regulatory policies.Overall,this paper demonstrates the important role played by institiutional environment factors in shaping the evolution of corporate leadership structure of listed companies in China and highlights the need for future analysis of formation and economic consequences of CEO duality to incorporate institutional environment factors.