关联并购、并购溢价率与公司业绩——基于控股股东支持视角的实证研究

Related-Party M&As,Acquisition Premium and Corporate Performance:Evidence from Controlling-Shareholder Propping

关联并购作为一种典型的兼并重组方式,在中国上市公司并购行为中普遍存在。本文以2008~2015年中国沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,基于控股股东支持的视角考察上市公司关联并购的动机及其经济后果。实证研究发现,上市公司发生亏损时更倾向于实施关联并购,而且关联并购相比非关联并购具有更低的并购溢价率。在亏损上市公司及股权集中度更高的上市公司中,关联并购溢价率低的现象更加明显。实施关联并购后,上市公司会计业绩并没有显著改善,但市场业绩显著提升。进一步研究发现,采用现金支付、并购标的是股权标的的关联并购具有更低的并购溢价率。本文的研究结果表明,在中国关联并购更有可能是控股股东支持而非掏空上市公司的一种手段,尤其在上司公司业绩不佳时。本文在理论上丰富了关联并购和公司治理等领域的研究文献,为揭示关联交易中控股股东的支持行为提供了新视角,在实践上则对构建更加公平规范的并购市场环境提供了有益借鉴。

Related-party mergers and acquisitions(M&A)are the common form of business reorganization across different listed firms in China.Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies during 2008-2015,we investigate the motivations and consequences of relatedparty M&As from the perspective of controlling-shareholder propping.We find that firms experiencing losses are more likely to engage in related-party M&As,and pay lower premium for related-party M&As than for non-related M&As.In particular,this effect is stronger for losing firms that have concentrated ownership.While there is no subsequent improvement in accounting performance for firms engaging in related-party M&As,their market performance is substantially enhanced.Further analysis indicates that related-party M&As with cash payment or with equity transfer have lower premiums.In contrast to prior evidence,our results show that related-party M&As are more likely motivated by controlling-shareholder propping rather than by controlling-shareholder tunneling,especially when the firm experiences poor performance.These results add to the literature on the relationship between related-party M&As and corporate governance,and highlight the role of firm performance in the motivation of controlling shareholders’M&A behavior.Overall,our results have implications for regulatory policies that intend to create a fair and efficient M&A market in practice.