基于前景理论的违规碳排放网络舆论监督三方演化博弈分析

Three-Party Evolutionary Game Analysis of Public Supervision on Illegal Carbon Emission Based on Prospect Theory

为了对企业违规碳排放网络舆论进行有效管理和监督,推动中国“双碳”目标的早日实现,基于前景理论,构建了政府、企业和社会公众针对违规碳排放网络舆论监督三方演化博弈模型,运用系统动力学的方法和Vensim软件进行数值仿真分析,结果表明:政府、企业和公众的心理效应会对主体在违规碳排放事件发生后的行为策略选择产生较大影响;增大对企业瞒报造假行为的惩罚力度,有利于企业如实公布违规碳排放信息;增加公众参与舆论监督的感知收益与降低公众选择造谣歪曲事实的概率有利于促进公众参与舆论监督,而公众参与网络舆论监督又有利于促进政府积极回应社会的关注,促使企业如实公布违规碳排放信息。建议提升对公众参与舆论监督的激励,同时需重点关注谣言的管控,增大对企业瞒报造假行为的处罚力度,并且关注其心理效应。

In order to effectively and publicly supervise illegal carbon emission and realize China's"double carbon"goal,a three-party game model of government,enterprises and public is constructed,and the simulation analysis is carried out with Vensim.The results show that the three parties'psychological effects have a great impact on the strategies applied after the illegal emission;Strict punishment for enterprises'concealment and fraud is conducive to the exposure of carbon emission;Increasing the perceived benefits of public participation and reducing the probability of the public choosing rumors can help promote public supervision;public participation also promotes the government's active response and enterprises'to truthful information publishing.It is suggested to improve the incentive for public participation,focus on rumor control,punish enterprises'concealment and fraud,and pay attention to the psychological effects.