投入品合资企业的反竞争效应与竞争政策——以我国移动通信市场为例

The Anticompetitive Effect of Input Joint Ventures and Competition Policy——The Cases from the Domestic Mobile Communication Market

投入品合资企业的反竞争效应应引起关注。本文构建理论模型,证明了投入品合资企业成立后,企业可联合控制投入品价格以提高合谋稳定性,维持产出品市场垄断高价,导致消费者福利水平降低。结合我国移动通信市场实际情况,发现投入品合资企业成立后,相关市场出现涉嫌协同定价的行为,导致移动通信服务价格较高。同时,本文实证检验了投入品合资企业对协调定价的影响,发现投入品合资企业的成立对移动通信市场价格趋同具有正向显著影响。最后,本文对我国反垄断立法与执法以及促进移动通信市场竞争提出了建议。

The anticompetitive effect of input joint ventures should be paid attention to.We establish a theoretical model and prove that after the establishment of the input joint ventures,the enterprises can jointly control the input price to improve the collusion stability,maintain the high price in the output market,and reduce the consumer welfare level.Combined with the actual case of domestic mobile telecommunications market,we find that after the establishment of input joint ventures,there are suspected coordinated pricing behaviors in relevant market,leading to higher price of mobile telecommunications services.Then,we empirically test the influence of input joint ventures on the coordinated pricing,and find that the establishment of input joint ventures in the case has a significant positive impact on the price convergence in the mobile telecommunications market.At last,we put forward some suggestions on the anti-monopoly legislation,enforcement and the promotion of competition for the mobile telecommunications market.