机构持股、管理层权力与高管薪酬——基于PSM-DID模型的分析

Institutional Shareholding,Management Power and Executive Compensation——Analysis Based on PSM-DID Model

本文将公司高管业绩—薪酬敏感性视为“公司良治”的一个结果,在利用倾向得分匹配控制了机构持股偏好基础上,将机构持股规模与持股结构纳入一个实证框架中,检验了机构持股对公司高管业绩—薪酬敏感性的影响,结论表明:机构投资者持股确实能够显著抑制高管薪酬操纵并提升上市公司高管业绩—薪酬敏感性,但这一作用需要机构持股相对集中才能实现,机构持股集中度成为机构投资者影响高管薪酬的调节变量。同时机构持股对高管业绩—薪酬敏感性的影响存在非对称性,在公司业绩下滑区间薪酬影响更为强烈。此外,机构持股的薪酬影响实现,主要是通过管理层限权而实现,在高管理层权力样本组中,机构持股对高管薪酬的影响被大大削弱。上述结论在经历一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。最后,本文提出了相关政策建议。

This paper selects the samples of Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2007 to 2019,and empirically tests the impact of institutional ownership and institutional ownership structure on executive compensation under the premise of using PSM+DID to effectively control the endogenous caused by institutional stock selection preference.The conclusion shows that institutional investors,shareholding can significantly inhibit executive compensation manipulation and improve the executive compensation performance sensitivity of listed companies,but this effect can only be realized by the relative concentration of institutional share-holding.The concentration of institutional shareholding has become a regulatory variable for institutional investors to affect executive compensation.At the same time,the impact of institutional ownership on executive performance compensation sensitivity is asymmetric,and the impact on compensation is stronger in the range of company performance decline.In addition,the impact of institutional ownership on executive compensation is mainly realized through management power restriction.In the sample group of senior management power,the impact of institutional ownership on executive compensation is greatly weakened.The above conclusion is still valid after a series of robustness tests.Finally,this paper puts forward relevant policy suggestions.