摘要
全球大型数字平台采取收购即扼杀的方式,针对创新型初创企业发起长期性、系统性和持续性的并购活动,引发了竞争主管机构的高度关注。数字平台扼杀式并购消除了在未来市场中可能具有强大实力的潜在竞争对手,因而进一步强化了数字平台的市场支配地位,致使颠覆式创新和公平竞争环境遭受损害。然而,由于数字市场的动态创新特征和平台企业的特殊性,我国反垄断并购审查在审查标准适用、竞争效应评估和审查工具适配方面面临难题。对此,需要引入交易额标准作为补充性申报门槛,并设置特定大型数字平台的申报义务;竞争效应评估应实施严格的非横向并购政策,重点审查并购交易对创新的影响;同时,基于信息不对称与错误成本的考量,应适当调整反垄断执法机构与数字平台之间的举证责任分配。
Large-scale digital platforms around the world have adopted a“acquire or kill”approach to launch long-term,systematic and sustained M&A activities against innovative start-ups,which has aroused the attention of the antitrust agencies.Digital platforms’killer acquisitions eliminate potential competitors that may be powerful in the future market,thereby further strengthening their market dominance,resulting in the detriment of disruptive innovation and the fair competition environment.However,due to the dynamic innovation characteristics of the digital market and the particularity of platform companies,Chinese antitrust merger review faces difficulties in the application of review standards,the assessment of competition effects,and the adaptation of review tools.In this regard,it is necessary to introduce the volume of trade standard as a supplementary review standard,and set the declaration obligation for specific large-scale digital platforms;the evaluation of competitive effects should implement a strict non-horizontal M&A policy,focusing on examining the impact of M&A transactions on innovation;meanwhile,the allocation of the burden of proof between antitrust enforcement agencies and digital platforms should be appropriately adjusted based on the consideration of information asymmetry and error costs.
作者
时祖光
SHI Zuguang(Southwest University of Political Science and Law,Chongqing 401120,China)
出处
《产业组织评论》
2022年第2期1-17,共17页
Industrial Organization Review
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目“创新社会治理背景下社会企业法律规制研究”(18AFX018)
西南政法大学学生科研创新项目“数字市场扼杀式并购的反垄断规制”(2021XZXSZC-003)
2022年重庆市研究生科研创新项目“数据要素时代中公共数据授权运营制度研究——以重庆市为例”(CYB22172)