消费者环保偏好、定价权差异与供应链减碳的契约协调

Consumer Environmental Preferences,Pricing Power and Contract Coordination for the Supply Chain's Carbon Reduction

消费者环保偏好引致的产品收入溢出是促进企业减碳的不可忽视的动力。通过建模分析发现在制造商和分销商博弈的供应链中,这种动力传导往往不畅,且随着定价权差异呈现异质性:制造商具有定价权时,利益博弈通过抑制减碳对利润影响的数量效应和产量水平,抑制动力传导;分销商具有定价权时,利益博弈通过抑制减碳对利润影响的产量水平和价格水平,抑制动力传导;两种情形均伴随着供应链利润损失,且前者产生的抑制动力传导的作用更强。制造商具有定价权情形,当环保偏好较弱时收益分享型契约能够提高减碳,当环保偏好较强时成本分担型契约能够提高减碳,且均实现帕累托改进。分销商具有定价权情形,收益分享和成本分担契约无解,因为通过契约实现的减碳收入溢出会被分销商通过定价权挤占,而无法改进制造商利润;限制分销商定价权是此情形下达成减碳激励契约的关键。研究结论为从供应链角度优化减碳治理提供了有益的政策启示。

The product revenue spillover caused by consumers'environmental preference is an important driving force for enterprises to reduce carbon emissions.Through modeling and analysis,it is found that in the supply chain with manufacturer and distributor gaming,this kind of power transmission is often not smooth,and presents heterogeneity with the difference of pricing power.When the manufacturer has pricing power,the interest game inhibits the power transmission by inhibiting the quantity effect and output level of the impact of carbon reduction on profit.When the distributor has the pricing power,the interest game inhibits the power transmission by inhibiting the output level and price level of the impact of carbon reduction on profits.Both cases are accompanied by supply chain profit loss,and the former has a stronger effect on inhibiting power transmission.When the manufacturer has pricing power,when the environmental preference is weak,the revenue-sharing contract can improve the carbon reduction,and when the environmental preference is strong,the cost-sharing contract can improve the carbon reduction,and both of them achieve Pareto improvement.If distributor has pricing power,there is no solution for revenue sharing and cost sharing contract,because the spillover of carbon reduction income realized through contract will be occupied by distributor through pricing power,and manufacturer's profit cannot be improved.Limiting the pricing power of distributors is the key to reach the carbon reduction incentive contract under this situation.The results provide useful policy implications for optimizing carbon reduction governance from the perspective of supply chain.