摘要
搜索引擎是典型的多边平台市场,网络效应、大数据和算法的结合使市场容易出现一家独大的结构。搜索引擎平台的支配地位通常具有效率基础,不应成为反垄断执法的目标,但是其获取、维持和扩展市场势力的滥用行为则应该受到反垄断法的严格禁止。搜索引擎反垄断不应采取"搜索中立"规制政策,反垄断应谨慎适用"必要设施"原理。搜索引擎平台反垄断政策应该坚持行为主义导向和采取"竞争损害底线"的原则,并以促进数据接入和保护用户隐私为政策重点。
The search engine platform is a typical multi-sided market.The combination of strong network effects,big data and algorithms makes the market prone to be tipping.The dominant position of search engine platform usually has an efficiency basis and should not be the target of Anti-monopoly law enforcement,but abuse of dominance should be strictly prohibited.The antitrust policy for search engine should not adopt the"search neutrality"regulation,and cautiously apply the"essential facilities doctrine".The antitrust should adopt the"competitive damage bottom line"principle,that is,only when the behavior of dominant platform harms competition,will it be prohibited,and the policy priority is to promote data access and sharing on the condition of privacy protection.
作者
唐要家
唐春晖
TANG Yaojia;TANG Chunhui(School of Economics,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China;School of Business Management,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China)
出处
《产业组织评论》
2020年第2期1-19,共19页
Industrial Organization Review
基金
国家社科基金重大项目“中国特色政府监管理论体系与应用研究”(18ZDA111)
国家社科基金重点项目“数字经济政府监管再定位及监管体系创新研究”(19AJY004)
关键词
搜索引擎
平台
多边市场
搜索中立
反垄断政策
search engine
platform
multi-sided market
search neutrality
antitrust policy