技术授权能否缩小技术水平的差距?

Can Licensing Reduce Technological Gap between Firms?

随着对外开放步伐加快,以及资本积累及技术进步,中国逐步在多个领域开展了与发达国家的合作。一些国内厂商遭遇了外国高技术厂商的歧视性技术授权。本文使用Gabszewicz and Thisse(1979)的垂直差异化模型分析第三方高技术厂商的歧视性技术授权行为。本文首先研究技术不可拆分且不允许差别定价的情形。研究发现高低技术厂商质量差异足够大时,第三方授权方会选择只授权高技术厂商;而第三方授权方几乎永远不可能只授权低技术厂商。因此低技术厂商永远不可能通过技术授权缩小与高技术厂商的差距。当技术可拆分时且允许差别定价时,第三方授权方将所有技术都授权给两厂商。高技术厂商面临的授权费更高。模拟结果发现只授权低技术厂商使得消费者剩余最大化。

Following the speed-up of reform and opening-up,capital accumulation and technological progress,China is now cooperating with many developed countries in many areas.Some domestic firms have encountered discriminatory technological licensing from foreign high-tech firms.This paper uses the vertical-differentiation model from Gabszewicz and Thisse(1979)to analyze the discriminatory technological licensing of a third-party high-tech licensor.We first study the case where technology is not separatable and price discrimination is not allowed.Results show that when the gap in product quality is sufficiently large,the third-party licensor chooses to accredit only the high-tech firm.The low-tech firm can almost never be accredited alone.Therefore,the low-tech firm can almost never reduce the distance from the high-tech firm by third-party technological licensing.When the technology is separable and price discrimination is allowed,the high-tech licensor accredits full technology to both firms with a higher charge to the high-tech firm.Simulations show that accrediting the low-tech firm alone leads to highest consumer surplus.