强制许可对专利药价格谈判的威慑作用研究

The Deterrent Effect of Compulsory Licensing on Branded Drug Price Negotiation

专利药价格谈判是有效降低药价的重要手段,而如何选择和利用强制许可等筹码是提高谈判成功率的关键。基于中国的实际情况,本文构建了专利药价格谈判的理论模型,分析了药品专利强制许可是否以及在何种条件下会对专利药价格谈判产生威慑作用。研究发现:在“医药分离”体制下,以强制许可作为专利药价格谈判的筹码,能够形成有效威慑并降低谈判价格。而在“以药养医”体制下,倘若“以药养医”的程度较高,当仿制药与专利药的质量差距较大,且两种药品的返利比率差额较小时,以强制许可作为谈判筹码无法形成有效威慑。本文的贡献在于识别在中国医疗体制下强制许可对专利药价格谈判产生威慑作用的条件,丰富了专利药价格谈判理论,为完善中国专利药价格谈判制度提供了支撑。

In order to obtain more affordable drugs,public agency negotiates for price drop with innovator pharmaceutical companies.The success rate of negotiation depends on how to choose and use the bargaining threat.The threat of issuing a compulsory license can help public agency increase the bargaining power vis-a-vis pharmaceutical companies.In this paper,we propose an analytical model for China’s drugs pricing negotiations and explore whether and under what conditions will the threat of issuing a compulsory license can help China’s public agency obtain significant price reduction in negotiations.It shows that such threat can be successful in bringing down the drug price if the medical and pharmaceutical services are separated,but it cannot help reduce the drug price when physicians care more about the kickback rather than patients’preference,the product differentiation between branded and generic drugs is large and the kickback gap between prescribing branded and generic drugs is small in the"drug maintaining medicine"system.The contribution of this paper lies in identifying the conditions under which China can use compulsory licensing threats in price negotiations,enriching the theory of drug price negotiation and developing a theoretical framework to support China’s drug price negotiation system.