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卖家干扰下平台的评价激励机制设计研究 被引量:1

Platform Incentive Mechanism for Buyer’s Feedback under Seller’s Manipulation
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摘要 在线交易平台评价反馈机制的关键在于买家是否愿意做出真实的评价。买家的评价一方面受平台对评价激励机制设计的影响;另一方面也受卖家干扰行为的影响。卖家的干扰行为包括正向的,如好评诱惑;或是负向的,如差评骚扰。为此,平台对买家评价的激励设计需要把卖家的干扰行为考虑进来。本文研究在存在卖家干扰行为的环境下,平台如何设计对买家评价的激励机制。主要结论包括:平台对买家的固定激励水平需要根据卖家的干扰行为的性质(好评诱惑或差评骚扰)进行调整;而在可变激励水平方面,平台对买家的激励并不受卖家干扰行为的影响;当平台中诚信交易占比较高时,允许卖家进行正向干扰(好评有礼)能够从总体上提高平台的收益。 The key to the feedback mechanism of online trading platform is whether the buyer is willing to make informative feedbacks.Buyers‘feedback is influenced by both the platform’s design of feedback incentive mechanism and sellers’interference behavior.Seller’s interference includes positive interference,such as favorable review temptation;Or negative interference,such as negative review harassment.Therefore,the design of platform’s incentive for buyers’feedback needs to take into account the interference behavior of the sellers.This paper studies how to design the incentive mechanism for buyers‘feedback under the sellers’interfering behaviors.The main conclusions include that the fixed incentive level of the platform to buyers needs to be adjusted according to the degree of sellers’interference behaviors(favorable review temptation or negative review harassment);In terms of variable incentive level,the incentive of the platform to buyers is not affected by sellers’interference behaviors.Third,when the proportion of credit transactions on the platform is relatively high,allowing sellers to engage in positive interference(favorable review temptation)can increase the platform’s revenue in general.
作者 王勇 张玮艺 陈祎芳 Yong Wang;Weiyi Zhang;Yifang Chen
出处 《产业经济评论(山东)》 2020年第4期1-29,共29页 Review of Industrial Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目“在线市场运行机制与监管方式研究”(科研项目编号:20171301634,课题编号:71773059) 教育部社会科学基金项目“平台经济双重治理体系的创新研究”(科研项目编号:20175770365,课题编号:17JHQ031)资助
关键词 声誉机制 评价反馈 卖家干扰 平台激励 Reputation System Feedback Seller’s Manipulation Platform Incentive Mechanism
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