审计监督、国资监管与国有企业治理——基于审计官员国资监管背景的研究

Audit Supervision, State-owned Assets Supervision and State-owned Enterprise Governance: A Study Based on the Background of Audit Officials in State-owned Assets Supervision

在全面深化国企改革的背景下,尤其是近期政府机构改革将国资委的经济责任审计和外派监事会职责划入审计机关,审计监督在国资监管与国企治理中发挥着愈加重要的作用。文章从审计官员的国资监管背景出发,考察了审计监督的国企治理效果。研究发现,审计官员的国资监管背景能够提高国有企业的会计信息质量,这一结果在审计官员的国资监管经历越久、审计监督力度越强以及国企内部的公司治理机制越薄弱时越显著,而地方主政官员干预会弱化审计官员的审计监督改善国企治理的作用。进一步研究表明,审计官员的国资监管背景还能减少国有企业的真实活动盈余管理,提升创新绩效,最终增加公司价值。文章从审计官员角度深入阐释了审计监督在国资监管和国企治理中的作用机理,研究结论对于监管层深化国企改革、完善国有企业和国有资本审计监督制度具有重要的政策启示。

In the context of the deepening reform of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)and particularly the duty of accountability audit and supervisory committee assigned to the government audit offices during the recent reform of government institutions,audit supervision plays an important role in the supervision of stateowned assets(SOAs)and the governance of SOEs.The existing literature mainly studies the governance effect of government audit on the listed central SOEs based on the audit finding announcements of central SOEs issued by the National Audit Office,but it generally regards government audit as a black box.In fact,officials usually play an active and significant role in the government’s decision-making.Therefore,this paper tries to examine the underlying mechanism of the governance effect of audit supervision on SOEs from the perspective of the background of audit officials in the supervision of SOAs.We conduct an empirical study with a sample of A-share listed local SOEs from 2003 to 2017,and find that the background of audit officials in the supervision of SOAs can improve the accounting information quality of SOEs.This result is more significant when audit officials’supervision experience of SOAs is longer,audit enforcement is more powerful,and SOEs’internal corporate governance is weaker.But the intervention of local leading officials due to political promotion incentives can weaken the governance effect of audit officials on SOEs.Further analysis indicates that the background of audit officials in the supervision of SOAs also has a real effect on SOEs,which can reduce the real earnings management,improve innovation performance,and ultimately increase the firm value.The findings of this paper not only confirm the heterogeneous impact of audit officials’subjective initiative on the supervision of SOAs and the governance of SOEs from the perspective of individual work experience,but also reveal the transmission path of local leading officials’influence on the decision-making of micro enterprises from the perspective of government audit,a professional administrative institution.Meanwhile,in the process of realizing the integration and optimization of audit supervision power and establishing a unified and efficient audit supervision system for the supervision of SOAs,the regulator should not only pay attention to training and improving the professional competence of audit officials through position experience,but also further strengthen the independence of audit offices and audit officials through deepening reform.